Penn State Law eLibrary
Journal Articles

Faculty Works

1997

The Misunderstood Alliance between Sports Fans,
Players, and the Antitrust Laws
Stephen F. Ross
Penn State Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/fac_works
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports
Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance between Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 519 (1997).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.

THE MISUNDERSTOOD ALLIANCE
BETWEEN SPORTS FANS,
PLAYERS, AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS
Stephen F Ross*
The baseballstrike and the ongoing hostilities between the players'
association and owners have evoked criticism and frustration among
fans and others. Although the players successfully defeated the owners'
most recent attempts to reduce major league competition, the threat of
future imposition of competitive restraints by the owners remains. In
this article, Professor Stephen F Ross argues that blanket restraintson
the marketfor players affirmatively inhibit on-the-field competition and
consequently offend the Sherman Act.
The article begins with the proposition that monopsony-price-fixing behavior by buyers', rather than sellers', cartels-implicates the
Sherman Act. Restraints on competition for players' services are thus
not exempt from the antitrust laws. As the author notes, restraints of
trade imposed by sports leagues are subject to antitrustscrutiny under a
rule of reason: under the standardset forth in NCAA v. Board of Regents, such restraintsare permissible where reasonably tailoredto promote competitive balance.
Professor Ross then applies the NCAA standard to blanket restraints imposed by sports leagues. He first demonstrates that the
waiver rule employed by some leagues is tailored to promote league
competition, because it allows inferior teams with large payrolls to rapidly improve in the standings by acquiringsuperiorplayers. To counter
the owners' arguments that restraintssuch as salary caps are necessary
to maintain league competition, Professor Ross relies on empirical evidence of the effect of these restraintson competitive balance and demonstrates that, in addition to not promoting competition, blanket
restraintsaffirmatively harm competitive balance. Salary caps, the author argues, not only transfer wealth from players to owners, but facilitate bland, uninteresting seasons in which the same teams have
consistently good or bad win-loss records.
* Professorof Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1976, J.D. 1979, University of California
(Berkeley). Subject to the usual disclaimers,the author thanks Lee Goldman, Kit Kinports, Bob
Lucke, Roger Noll, Tom Ross, Jack Sidorov, and Andrew Zimbalistfor helpful comments.
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The article includes a discussion of less restrictive means of promoting competitive balance, including revenue sharing and progressive
salary caps, which might pass antitrust muster. Professor Ross concludes thatfree competition in the player marketprotects the interests of
both fans and players, such that an alliance of consumers and players
might be an effective way to combat the threatto baseballwhich blanket
restraints may pose in the future.
I.

INTRODUCrION

One of the ironies of modern sports law is that baseball-which
has been held to be an "anomaly," uniquely exempt from the Sherman Act's prohibition on unreasonable restraints of trade'-has fewer
restraints on competition for players than other major professional
sports leagues. This anomaly is in turn the result of another ironyalthough unions are usually created in order to reduce competition in
the labor market and thereby enhance the workers' bargaining power,
the Major League Baseball Players' Association has been successful in
forcing owners to increase competition. Last fall, a devastating labor
dispute that caused the unprecedented cancellation of the 1994 World
Series was resolved with an agreement that will sustain the union's
demand for preserving effective competition in the labor market.2
This is not the first time the union had fought against labor market restraints. Over a century ago, baseball's owners created a completely restrictive system-the reserve clause-that prohibited any
competition for players' services. After the Supreme Court reaffirmed baseball's antitrust exemption and thereby rejected the courageous effort of star outfielder Curt Flood-financed by the players'
union-to invalidate the reserve clause under the Sherman Act, the
union achieved the same result in a contract arbitration case that per1.

See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972). The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988),

makes unlawful every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade.
2. The framework for significant competition for player services, where players with more
than six years of major league service face no restrictions on competing offers, is retained. The
tentative agreement implements a "luxury tax" on five teams with very high payrolls. Teams

who spend more than designated amounts each year must pay a tax of approximately 35% on
the excess ($51 million is the threshold for the first year). The tax would not be in effect for the
last one or two years of the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement also would phase in
significant revenue sharing. See Bob Nightengale, Peace at Last, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1996, at

C1. The revenue-sharing plan would allocate proceeds from a modest tax (ranging from 2.5-5%)
on all players' salaries to poorer teams, as well as a portion of local broadcast revenues currently
retained exclusively by each club, to low-revenue teams. See Murray Chass, Team Owners Approve Revenue-Sharing Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at B10.
Even before the plan was ratified, an example of its effect was the signing by the cash-poor
Minnesota Twins of all-star second baseman Chuck Knoblauch to a multimillion-dollar long-

term contract. The signing would not have been possible were the Twins not expecting to be the
beneficiaries of the subsidies available in the new revenue-sharing plan. See Mark Maske, Selig
Has Votes for Deal, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1996, at D10.
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mitted a player to negotiate with other teams after a one-year option
at the expiration of his contract. 3
Baseball's most recent labor battle centered on the owners' attempts to join their football and basketball colleagues in establishing
either a leaguewide "salary cap," a complex mechanism that limits the
total amount each team can spend on players' salaries, 4 or a punitive
"luxury tax" on teams with above average payrolls.5 Both a salary cap
and a luxury tax, like an outright ban on competition for players, inhibit a team from outbidding its rivals for a player even though the
player will be more valuable to that team. A critical aspect of all these
schemes (hereinafter referred to collectively as "blanket restraints") is
that they apply to all teams, regardless of their past performance on
the field, court, or ice. Although the recent tentative baseball agreement does contain a luxury tax, it is designed so as to affect only a
handful of clubs each year. Therefore, most teams-and importantly,
almost all the clubs with inferior recordsT-will retain the ability to
substantially increase their payrolls so as to improve the quality of
their teams.
Baseball fans are obviously happy that labor peace finally has
been achieved for the National Pastime. Too often, however, the public has equated a union's success with a complete disregard for the
interests of fans-as if greedy players and owners were involved in a
3. See Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (Dec. 23, 1975).
4. Although the details of each league's salary cap differ, for antitrust purposes the salient
elements of these schemes can be briefly summarized. Each league commits to pay its players a
specific percentage of "designated gross revenue," revenue that the league and its member
teams receive from a variety of specified sources, including live gate, broadcast rights, and licensing rights. The commitment is intended to be both a floor and a cap on player personnel expenses. Based on the league's overall revenue figures for the prior year, the league sets the
salary cap for the coming year. NFL rules require, and NBA rules encourage, clubs with low
payrolls to increase their expenditures to ensure that the agreed-upon percentage of gross revenue is indeed spent on player salaries.
The National Hockey League (NHL) does not use a salary cap. Although the NHL has
modified the restraint historically employed by sports leagues (a complete prohibition on any
team's bidding for the services of a player who was previously employed by a rival club), unrestricted competition exists only for a minority of veteran players with extensive league service.
Players with less seniority may receive competitive bids, but teams other than the one for whom
the player previously contracted to play must "compensate" the prior employer with a player
from its existing roster and/or a draft choice. This requirement substantially inhibits competitive
bids for these players.
5. See Murray Chass, Baseball Talks Are Collapsing as Impasse Nears, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
22, 1994, at B13, B17.
6. See Nightengale, supra note 2, at C1.
7. Next year, for example, the five teams subject to the luxury tax are the New York
Yankees, Baltimore Orioles, Atlanta Braves, Cleveland Indians, and Chicago White Sox. See
Andrew Brandt, The Business of Sports (last visited Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.bizsports.com/
mlb.html> (hard copy on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). The first four were
playoff teams; the White Sox finished in second place in the American League's Central Division
with an 85-77 record. See Mike Kiley, New Faces Joining Old in Playoffs, CHI. TRm., Sept. 30,
1996, Sports at 1; Paul Sullivan, Twins 5, White Sox 4 Ending Is Just a Beginningfor Sox Personnel, Cm. TRm., Sept. 30, 1996, Sports at 3.
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messy food fight over their respective slices of the pie, resulting in no
dessert for the rest of us. This article offers an alternative view: that
the owners' attempts to restrain trade not only increase their share of
the pie, but also make the pie blander and less tasty. By contrast, the
players' fight to preserve competition permits mediocre teams to improve and results in more exciting championship races. The recent
unprecedented success of two expansion teams in the National Football League, who, given the opportunity to sign free agents never
before offered to expansion teams, propelled themselves into the conference championship games in only their second year of play, represents another well-publicized example of why blanket restraints are
bad for fans.' In short, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division
should consider conferring its annual John Sherman award posthumously on Curt Flood, and concurrently on Donald Fehr, the head of
the players' union, because the players' efforts closely resemble the
outcome that should result from antitrust scrutiny of the owners' efforts to restrain trade.
Were rivals in most other industries to impose similar restraints,
they would be harshly punished under the antitrust laws. However,
because of the unique interdependence of the teams comprising a
sports league, the law generally requires a more careful competitive
inquiry in the sports context. Applying the relevant antitrust principles, such an inquiry should conclude that a blanket restraint is illegal,
unless it is protected from antitrust scrutiny because of judicial precedents finding previously challenged baseball practices to be exempt
from the antitrust laws9 or because of the blanket restraint's relationship to collective bargaining with a players' union. 10 With these cave8.

See John Helyar, Free Agency Proves to Be the Cat's Meow for Jags and Panthers,

WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1997, at Al.
9. For a discussion of why these precedents would no longer preclude antitrust scrutiny of
blanket player restraints, see Stephen F. Ross, Reconsidering Flood v. Kuhn, 12 U. MIAMi J.

SPORTS & ETr. L. 169 (1995). That article suggests that Flood's unwillingness to subject baseball
to antitrust scrutiny was primarily based on the Court's opinion that antitrust doctrines were not

sufficiently flexible to deal with baseball's unique needs and, specifically, that significant restraints on competition for players was absolutely essential for the National Pastime to survive.
See id. at 174. Both of these two conceptual underpinnings are demonstrably untrue today, and

thus current jurisprudence concerning the application of stare decisis to statutory interpretation
cases, such as Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-75 (1989), suggests that Flood
warrants overruling.
10. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994), exempts labor union activity from
antitrust scrutiny. In Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 689-90 (1965), the Supreme Court implied a "nonstatutory" antitrust exemption for employers whose collective bargaining agreement with a labor union was challenged under the antitrust
laws. In the sports context, Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977), and McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir.

1979), established the proposition that restraints among rival teams incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement that resulted from bona fide arms' length negotiation with the players
was exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Last Term, in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116,
2123-24 (1996), the Supreme Court held that the nonstatutory exemption also protected agree-

ments among owners that had not been agreed to by the union, so long as the owners' agreement
took place in the context of lawful collective bargaining.
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ats, blanket restraints run afoul of the antitrust doctrine that governs
restrictions on competition imposed in any industry where rivals have
a legitimate reason to combine forces for some economic purpose:
they are more restrictive than reasonably necessary to accomplish a
sports league's legitimate goals.
Specifically, this article suggests that blanket restraints have a
fundamental flaw that puts them in violation of the Sherman Act's
prohibition on unreasonable restraints of trade. Their justificationindeed, the only justification courts have found to support the unique
sort of trade restraints agreed to by sports league owners-is that they
promote competitive balance among the league's teams and thereby
increase consumer demand for, and enjoyment of, the product. However, because these restraints apply indistinguishably to good and bad
teams, they do not improve competitive balance, certainly not when
compared to an obvious alternative that would limit the restraint to
franchises with superior rosters, as measured by previous records."
Indeed, by restraining teams with inferior rosters, blanket restraints
affirmatively harm competitive balance.
Although the new baseball agreement does not, as suggested
here, directly tailor the luxury tax to promote competitive balance, it
achieves a decent second best. By increasing the ability and incentive
of financially poorer teams to improve through revenue sharing and
rules designed to encourage low-payroll clubs to spend more, and by
limiting only a few of the teams with the highest payrolls (most, but
not necessarily all, of whom have superior players), the players' union
has preserved a market that at least resembles the sort of market that
would exist if the owners' efforts had been challenged by the Federal
Trade Commission rather than the players.
Public and judicial acceptance of this player-fan-antitrust alliance
remains important in the wake of baseball's labor controversy. Judicial recognition that a salary cap would violate the Sherman Act will
give all professional athletes an incentive to counter owner demands
that blanket restraints be included in the collective bargaining agreements with threats to decertify their union and their collective bargaining relationship in the future, thus depriving owners of a claim for
exemption from antitrust scrutiny. 12 In addition, a conclusion that
11. Under the analysis used in this article, the amateur drafts used by each major sports
league are not "blanket restraints," but are tailored restrictions that allow teams to obtain exclu-

sive negotiating rights to amateurs using a selection process that advantages teams with inferior
win-loss records. The legality of these drafts is complicated, because the competition-balancing

effect of a draft applied to the top 30 rookies each year may be quite different than the effect of a
multiple round draft, and requires a sufficiently detailed and distinct analysis from that appropriate for salary caps and other blanket restraints as to be beyond the scope of this article.

12.

Indeed, this is precisely what NFL players did a few years ago. Compare Powell v.

NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 568, superseded by 930 F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that NFL

restraint is exempt from antitrust attack, even though not part of a collective bargaining agreement, because an ongoing collective bargaining relationship existed between owners and players'
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blanket restraints are illegal will influence how courts respond to antitrust challenges to future owner conduct that harms competition and
jeopardizes the sport, if the plaintiffs13 were consumers or the government rather than organized players.
Part II of this article first develops the argument that the Sherman Act permits owners to agree with each other, even to the point of
restraining competition, but only to the extent that they can justify
their restraints as reasonably necessary to achieve legitimate, procompetitive goals.' 4 Part II then demonstrates that the only legitimate
goal that can justify restraining competition for players' services is the
15
need to increase on-the-field balance between competing teams.
Part III applies this legal standard to the blanket restraints currently
imposed by the major North American sports leagues.' 6 First, the
waiver rule, a restraint that is used in some form by each league and
that is tailored to promote competitive balance, is discussed briefly
and contrasted with blanket restraints. Next, empirical evidence concerning restraints and competitive balance is marshalled to demonstrate not only that blanket restraints do not increase competitive
balance but, indeed, that these restraints affirmatively reduce competitive balance. Finally, reasonable alternatives to improve competitive
balance are analyzed.' 7
II.

THE RELEVANT ANTITRUST CONSTRAINTS ON SPORTS
LEAGUES

Both sports fans and players must look to the Sherman Act as the
principal source of competition law' 8 relevant to restraints of trade
union), with Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding that decertification of NFL Players Association stripped owners of labor exemption and permitted antitrust
challenge), and White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1412-16, 1435-36 (D. Minn. 1993) (describing
settlement of antitrust litigation after jury verdict against NFL and noting resumption of collective bargaining between NFL and players' union), affd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994). Although
the NBA players recently ratified a new collective bargaining agreement with the league, they
did so only after an unsuccessful effort to decertify the union and challenge the NBA's salary cap
under the antitrust laws, which led to further management concessions. See Clifton Brown,
N.B.A. and Players Union Reach Agreement, N.Y. TImEs, June 29, 1996, at A27.
13. Every recent challenge to a sports league's player restraint has come from a player
represented by a union and has alleged that the unreasonable restraint occurred in the labor
market. In Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690 n.5, the Court held that antitrust liability depends on
consideration of a restraint's "relative impact on the product market and the interests of union
members." A consumer challenge to a restraint that had a significant effect on the product
market, no benefits for union members, and no general benefits derived from the industrial
peace that comes with a collective bargaining agreement seems to raise significantly different
issues than those raised in Brown, where the alleged anticompetitive effect was in the labor
market.
14. See infra notes 29-71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 72-135 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 181-275 and accompanying text.
18. This article examines only the substantive legal constraints on sports owners' ability to
agree to restrain competition among themselves for players' services. The procedures the own-
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among rival teams. 19 Despite the Sherman Act's broad prohibition of
all contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade, the
Supreme Court has construed the statute to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.2 ° In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board
of Regents (NCAA), 21 the Supreme Court set forth the standard that
governs sports league trade restraints. The Court noted that the antitrust laws have traditionally presumed that certain types of agreements among competitors are unreasonable, yet have recognized that
competing sports teams must agree among themselves on a host of
issues in order for the product to exist at all. Thus, sports league rules
but are subject to antitrust scrutiny under a
are not "per se illegal,"
"rule of reason."'22 According to NCAA, the "essential inquiry" is
"whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition. ' 23
Where the plaintiff establishes that the defendant has significantly restrained competition-where individual competitors have lost
their freedom to compete, the restraint has had a clear effect on price,
and, most significantly, where price has not been responsive to consumer preferences-the defendant then has the "heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense which competitively justifies this
apparent deviation from the operations of a free market. 2z4 NCAA
therefore requires that sports leagues present a procompetitive justification for their agreements. As detailed below, the only such rationale that can properly justify significant restraints on competition in the
player market is the need to maintain competitive balance among the
league's teams.
NCAA also reflects the long tradition in antitrust law that proscribes overly restrictive agreements among rivals, even when they
have legitimate reasons to combine their economic activities. Players
ers use to implement their agreement could give rise to liability under labor law. See, e.g.,
Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246, 250
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d. Cir. 1995). But American labor law generally does not constrain the substance of the restrictions imposed by owners. Cf. Sulkowicz v. Parramatta Dist.
Rugby League Club (Indus. Comm'n of New South Wales) (May 31, 1983) (applying the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (N.S.W.) § 88f(1), which gives the Industrial Court wide powers to set

aside a contract judged to be "unfair, harsh, or unconscionable," to void an overly restrictive
player contract), cited in G.M. KELLY, SPORT AND THE LAW: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
291-92 (1987).
19. Because the rules of interstate sports leagues must necessarily be uniform, courts have
precluded application of state antitrust law or common law to sports league restraints. See Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284-85 (1972); Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674,
679 (Cal. 1983); State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1, 17 (Wis. 1996). The common law

of restraint of trade is a creation of state law, and there is no mechanism for uniform federal
review of common-law decisions. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 626 (1875)
(stating that "[s]tate courts are the appropriate tribunals... for the decision of questions arising
under their local law, whether statutory or otherwise").

20.

See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).

21.
22.
23.
24.

468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id. at 100-03.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 107-13, 110.
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and fans are allies in enforcing this antitrust tradition. As a whole,
players benefit if reasonable restrictions result in a better product that
produces more revenue, especially where the labor market is sufficiently unrestrained so that owners will devote much of the increased
revenue to higher salaries. Fans benefit because overly broad restrictions diminish the quality of the product. These restraints frustrate
supporters of teams with inferior talent, who want their teams to improve quickly, and sports fans generally respond more favorably to
exciting seasons where teams are balanced competitively.25
Before turning to the substantive antitrust doctrine applicable to
sports leagues, subpart A below first considers and rejects the contention made by sports leagues and their academic sympathizers that the
Sherman Act has no application to player restraints because the federal antitrust laws are concerned solely with restraints on the supply of
goods and services to consumers. 26 Not only is such an argument contrary to precedent, but it is factually flawed because, as will be more
fully developed in part III, blanket restraints on player competition
do, in fact, reduce the quality of the game viewed by sports fans. Subpart B then proceeds to explain how the Supreme Court's antitrust
standard for sports leagues, established in the NCAA case, applies to
player restraints. 27 Specifically, I conclude that sports leagues imposing significant restraints on competition must demonstrate that their
restraints are reasonably necessary to enhance competitive balance on
the field, and I explain why other plausible justifications for such restraints are not entitled to recognition under the antitrust laws. Finally, subpart C briefly weighs in on the long-running academic
dispute as to whether sports leagues are economically integrated "single entities," like corporations or partnerships, that are not even subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
25. See infra note 81. In contrast, the luxury tax agreed to by baseball owners last fall is set
at a level so that it affects only a handful of teams. In fact, it is unlikely to result in a significant
restraint on rival clubs' willingness and ability to compete for player services and thus would not
appear to pose antitrust problems. Similarly, if the detailed rules adopted by a league to implement its cap/tax were so riddled with loopholes that they did not substantially limit teams with
high payrolls from competing aggressively for veteran star players, an antitrust plaintiff would
fail to establish a prima facie case and the league would not be required to provide any

justification.
There has been early speculation that the current NBA salary cap may fall within the latter

category, but the substantial number of free agents who were signed by new teams this summer
does not necessarily support that conclusion. Although veteran players usually sign multiyear

contracts, a record number of basketball stars saw their contracts expire at the conclusion of the
1995-96 season. The new collective bargaining agreement tightened some previously discovered
loopholes in the salary cap, but in return the owners agreed to a more generous formula for

computing the cap, so that each team was permitted to spend significantly more money in 1996
than in 1995. Thus, it would be premature to conclude that the NBA salary cap will not work as

a significant limitation on a team's ability to pursue needed free agents in future years.
26.
27.

See infra notes 29-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 72-135 and accompanying text.

28. See infra notes 136-70 and accompanying text.
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The Sherman Act's Applicability to Restraints in the Labor
Market

NCAA dealt with an agreement among college football teams
that restrained competition in the sale of television rights. The blanket restraints addressed in this article involve agreements restraining
competition in the purchase of players' services. Some defenders of
anticompetitive sports league practices have suggested that the NCAA
formulation is inapplicable to these blanket restraints, because the
Sherman Act is limited to restraints harming consumers, and blanket
restraints restrain trade solely in labor markets.2 9 This argument is
unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, the premise is flawed
because blanket restraints do harm consumers. As precedent and
economic theory suggest, any salary restraint will necessarily have a
long-run effect on the quantity, quality, and distribution of athletes
offering their services in a particular sport. As detailed in part III
below, the particular restraints that have been adopted or sought by
the major professional sports leagues owners all contain objectionable
features that directly diminish the fans' enjoyment of their chosen
spectator sport. Second, the argument is legally incorrect, for the
Sherman Act has a broad scope that covers any unjustified restraint
on competition, even if the restraint does not demonstrably harm consumers or reduce output. Narrowing the Sherman Act's scope to output-reducing restraints that directly affect consumers is inconsistent
with the Act's legislative history and a sound interpretation of Congress's intent.
The argument that the Sherman Act does not apply to restraints
on competition for players' services is premised on the notion that,
unlike most goods and services in our economy, teams that together
possess monopsony power 30 may drive down the wages paid, but not
the number of players who will participate in major league sports. In
their book Monopsony, Professors Roger Blair and Jeffrey Harrison
concede that, because "[llabor is an extremely perishable commodity-an hour not worked today can never be recovered"-and because "high-quality professional athletes are so scarce that their wages
as athletes generally are well above their next most lucrative endeavor," restraints in the labor market are unlikely to significantly affect the supply of players (or, in economic terms, the "supply curve"

29. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996) (No.
95-388); Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principlesand Collective Bargaining
by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (1971); Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling
FederalLabor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints,
75 GEo. L.J. 19, 34-58 (1986).
30. Monopsony occurs when there is a single buyer of a specified good or service. See
ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY 3 (1993).
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for athletes is highly "inelastic"). 31 Nevertheless, Blair and Harrison
conclude that "collusion creates expectations that have long-run significance. ' 32 In fact, economic theory, common sense, and a comparison of current players with their counterparts from earlier years
suggest that the higher salaries commanded in today's less restrained
market affect players' training (especially in the off-season), their longevity in the game, and, over time, the decisions gifted athletes make
in choosing the sport in which to concentrate their efforts.3 3
Moreover, collusion among buyers that disturbs the operation of
a free market in nonfungible goods and services is likely to have another effect on consumers: the objects of the cartel (in this case, the
players) will probably not be allocated efficiently among the buyers
(the teams). If the market is not allocating input, someone else is doing so, likely in an inefficient way. For a nonsports example, consider
the cases involving motion picture "splits," a practice whereby competing theater operators agree among themselves to grant exclusive
negotiation rights for the licensing of particular movies and which the
34
courts often condemn as per se violations of the Sherman Act.
Whatever the short- or long-term effects on the production of movies,
another effect is that the theater best-suited to feature a particular
movie will not necessarily be the one receiving the license from the
31. Id. at 72. Because there are no realistic alternatives for skilled baseball, football, basketball, and hockey players other than Major League Baseball, the National Football League,
the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League, respectively, these
leagues are monopsonists where the owners agree among themselves to limit competition for
player services.
32. Id.
33. A typical athlete's reservation price, the minimum salary he will accept with no costly
effort, is probably lower than an artificially reduced salary paid under a blanket restraint, because his marketability in a nonsports job is usually much lower than as a professional athlete.
This fact explains the conventional wisdom underlying the argument that player restraints do not
affect output-that a wage significantly less than one available in a free market will attract the
same number of players. This "wisdom" fails to recognize that a professional athlete's performance on the field, court, or ice is a function of both ability and effort. Players with below-average
natural ability who are capable of significant improvement if they expend sufficient effort have
less reason to do so if the economic incentives are artificially reduced. I thank Roger Noll for
these insights.
The converse of this insight, of course, is that the high salaries provided by unrestricted
competition for player services will lead some young men with insufficient natural ability to
waste incredible effort in an unsuccessful attempt to play major league sports, a result with
profound and adverse social implications. The antitrust laws, however, do not permit private
institutions like sports leagues to justify restraints of trade on the ground that competition leads
to socially undesirable results. See National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
695-96 (1978). In any event, it is not clear that the public policy that best inhibits an overemphasis on athletics among teenage boys is one that simply allows incredibly wealthy team owners to
exploit the few boys who develop into men with the talent to actually play at the professional
level.
34. See, e.g., Harkins Amusement Enters. v. General Cinema Corp., 850 F.2d 477, 486 (9th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 148-55 (E.D. Wis. 1983), affd,
756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985). One contrary precedent is Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists
Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 316-17 (6th Cir. 1989), where the court was more tolerant of split
agreements because it perceived that they might result in lower prices for consumers. Professors
Blair and Harrison demonstrate why this is false. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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distributor, because "rights" have been given to another theater (usually following a "draft"). 35 As detailed in part III, blanket restraints in
the sports context have this same feature-players are not necessarily
distributed among teams to reach the result preferred by sports fans as
a whole.36
Even if blanket restraints had no effect whatsoever on the
number and quality of athletes participating in a sport or on the allocation of players among teams, the Sherman Act ought to be interpreted to proscribe unjustified collusion among team owners that
restrains trade significantly. The only way to reach a contrary conclusion would be to find that the framers of the Sherman Act were unconcerned with the distributive effects of cartels in general or that the
Sherman Act contains an implicit exemption for labor markets.
Neither theory is supportable.
35. Theater operators could achieve an efficient allocation of films by using an internal
auction to determine which theater would be allocated the exclusive negotiation rights to a particular film. Cf. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1898)
(describing such a system among iron pipe manufacturers), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Of course,
where operators or motion picture distributors perceived that an allocation was inefficient, side
payments could be made to reallocate the films. However, such side payments involve significant transaction costs. See, e.g., General Cinema, 850 F.2d at 485 (discussing procedures for
reallocating a film following a split). Indeed, the theaters' choice of a rotational "draft," as
opposed to an internal auction, may itself be evidence that the transaction costs of an internal
market system were significant. This inference is even stronger where it appears that the parties
to the agreement are not seeking, for noneconomic reasons, to supplant a marketplace allocation
with an allocation that serves goals other than efficiency, and where the defendants are not
presenting an affirmative defense that seeks to justify their allocation as an efficient means of
avoiding marketplace imperfections (such as the need for sports leagues to maintain competitive
balance). I thank my colleagues Tom Ulen and Peter Maggs for these insights.
36. One commentator who opposes the Sherman Act's application to player restraints on
the ground that they are not output-reducing argues that the only relevant output for a sports
league is the number of games it plays-a variable which is virtually never reduced. See Michael
S. Jacobs, ProfessionalSports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the
Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 53-54 (1991). This argument has no support in judicial precedents,
and for good reason.
From the perspective of consumers, on whose behalf the Sherman Act was enacted, games
played are simply not the only measure of output. Jacobs seems to acknowledge that leagues
might artificially reduce the viewership of games on television, but simply dismisses this possibility without discussion. Indeed, such a move would significantly injure consumers. See Stephen
F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J.
463, 486-88 (1990) [hereinafter Ross I]. Moreover, contrary to Professor Jacobs's assertion,
supra, at 54, 57, agreements by rivals to harm consumers by reducing the quality of a product are
illegal under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., National Macaroni Mfrs. v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421,427 (7th
Cir. 1965) (invalidating agreement among rival pasta producers who were faced with a shortage
of high-quality wheat and agreed to use 50% low-quality grain). Thus, Jacobs incorrectly concludes that sports leagues do not violate the antitrust laws when they choose an inefficient system of player allocation because the money they save as the result of an inefficient monopsony
labor market outweighs the modest increases in revenue they would gain from the more exciting
championship races that accompany efficient player allocations. Cf. Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly
Sports Leagues, 73 MrNN. L. REv. 643, 676 (1989) [hereinafter Ross II] (suggesting that this was
the case with baseball's previous complete prohibition of free agency). Illegal quality reduction,
for these purposes, focuses on overall consumer welfare. Thus, agreements that effectively reduce the absolute quality of a product based on an abstract standard but make the product
available to more consumers (such as expansion of a sports league) would be considered to be
pro- rather than anticompetitive.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1997

I have suggested elsewhere that the Sherman Act should be interpreted in a democratic fashion, to reflect the views of the voters who
elected the legislators who passed the statute. 37 Voters in 1890 and a
century later are vitally concerned with distributive issues-whether a
restraint is likely to affect them as workers or consumers (only a minority of voters significantly benefit from cartels as stockholders).
These voters would have every reason to proscribe, and no reason to
tolerate, unjustified cartels that artificially increased the prices of
goods sold, or decreased the price of goods bought or wages paid,
regardless of allocative efficiency.
My argument for a populist interpretation of the antitrust laws is
supported by the actual legislative history of the Sherman Act. The
argument that the Sherman Act is concerned solely with cartels that
result in allocatively inefficient reductions in output has been thoroughly canvassed and rejected; the scholarship demonstrating that the
antitrust laws are generally intended to proscribe concerted efforts to
transfer wealth to "carteleers" from those with whom they do business
need not be repeated here.3' In an excellent survey of the legislative
history of the Sherman Act as it relates to labor markets, Professor
Lee Goldman has demonstrated that, rather than intending to exempt
these markets from the Act's coverage, the law's sponsors desired "to
protect the rights of the individual from the evils of accumulated corporate wealth and power in all markets."39 For example, Senator
Sherman commended a state court decision that in his view set out
"the general principle" defining unlawful combinations: those combinations that have "a necessary tendency to prejudice the public or to
oppress individuals by unjustly subjecting them to the power of the
confederates."4 This broad concern with economic oppression stands
37. See STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 10 (1993); cf. Herbert
Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 63, 74-94 (1990)

(arguing that a system of democratic government where votes may not be sold presupposes that
laws will maximize wealth for the majority rather than for society as a whole). Interpreting a
statute to effectuate the public interest that led to the legislation's enactment has a venerable
history. See generally Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. 1584), reprinted in HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1111 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994). Even those who criticize this theory, on the ground that legislatures do not
usually pass laws to serve the public interest but rather to accommodate the demands of powerful special interests, concede that the Sherman Act is indeed a statute passed to further the
public interest. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 533, 544

(1983).
38. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 16-27 (1982); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Originaland Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 69-71
(1982).
39. Lee Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to Employers'
Labor Market Restraints in Sports and Non-Sports Markets, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 617, 623 (emphasis added).
40. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890), reprinted in I EARL W. KrNTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HisTORY OF TIE FEDERAL ANTRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 121-22 (1978) (quoting
Commonwealth ex rel. Chew v. Carlisle, Brightly's N.P. 36, 40 (Ct. of Nisi Prius 1821)).
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in stark contrast to the argument that the Sherman Act tolerates
cartelization 41of markets simply because of the absence of direct consumer effect.
Professors Blair and Harrison also have demonstrated why the
Sherman Act should be democratically interpreted to proscribe restraints in the labor market: any savings are unlikely to be passed on
to the consumer majority who sent the Sherman Act's framers to Congress. Their economic analysis shows what Senator Sherman recognized in 1890-that firms conspiring to reduce costs simply pocket the
savings, and the price charged to consumers depends on the "confederates"' own decisions as to how much of their product to sell. 42 Senator Sherman's condemnation of agreements that do not lead to price
increases is a major reason why scholars have concluded that allocative efficiency in product markets is not the principal goal of the Sherman Act.43
Further support for this reading of the statute is provided by the
venerable canon of statutory interpretation that rejects any proffered
construction which produces an absurd result. 44 In light of the Sherman Act's legislative history, it is inconceivable that Congress could
have intended to impose liability in those cases where farmers, workers, or small firms victimized by a trust could mitigate (but not eliminate) their damages by turning to other crops, employers, or buyers,
but to exonerate trusts with such a monopsonistic control over their
victims as to leave the victims no alternative but to provide the same
harvest, labor, or goods at an artificially reduced price. Rather, this
type of agreement, analogous to unjustified sports league restraints,
appears to lead to the very unjust subjugation of individuals to the
conspiracy that Senator Sherman sought to prohibit. 45 A statutory interpretation that seeks to excuse an otherwise illegal restraint because
professional athletes are so subject to exploitation that a competitionlessening agreement has no effect on supply would create such an absurd result: a blanket restraint imposed by a monopoly league in a
major sport where there are no alternatives for players or fans (such
as the National Football League) would be legal, but the same (or a
lesser) restraint in a league that faced competition (in Major League
Soccer, for example, where an artificial reduction in salaries would
probably drive players overseas) would be unlawful.
41. Goldman notes that even a proposed amendment to the bill (successfully rejected by
Senator Sherman and his cosponsors), which would have weakened the Act by allowing conspiracies that reduce prices to consumers, contained a proviso excluding from its exemption lower
costs associated with reduced wages. Goldman, supra note 39, at 624.
42. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 30, at 40-43; cf. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890) (state-

ment of Sen. Sherman) (quoting Sen. George: "'They aggregate to themselves great, enormous
wealth by extortion which makes the people poor."').
43. See Lande, supra note 38, at 86-87.
44. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989).

45. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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Judicial precedent also undermines the argument that the Sherman Act covers only output-limiting restraints. The leading case is
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,' where
the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of an antitrust complaint
brought by sugar beet farmers against colluding sugar refiners.
Neither the Court's broad language nor the facts alleged in the complaint imply that antitrust plaintiffs must prove specifically that output
or consumer welfare has been harmed by collusive buying. The Court
unequivocally held that the "statute does not confine its protection to
consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers.... The
Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are
made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
perpetrated. '4 7 Thus, conspiracies that simply result in a wealth transfer from sellers or buyers to the carteleers are illegal, even without
evidence of an effect on output.
Moreover, both the employees in an earlier case, Anderson v.
Shipowners Ass'n,4 s and the beet farmers in Mandeville prevailed
even though their complaints did not allege that the monopsony cartels they faced reduced output. Anderson reinstated a complaint filed
by a seaman who was challenging the cartel system of registration for
employment agreed to by virtually all shipowners on the Pacific Coast.
The complaint detailed the pervasive control the shipowners' association exercised over employment, although the Court's description of
the complaint contained nary a word concerning the restraint's effect
on output or resource allocation.4 9 The Court then held:
From these averments, the conclusion results that each of the
shipowners and operators, by entering into this combination, has,
in respect of the employment of seamen, surrendered himself
completely to the control of the associations. If the restraint thus
imposed had related to the carriage of goods in interstate and
foreign commerce ... the unlawful restraint would be clear. But
ships and those who operate them are instrumentalities of commerce ... no less than cargoes.50
The Court concluded its analysis by identifying what it perceived as
the harm that warranted antitrust sanction: "[I]t appears that each
shipowner and operator in this widespread combination has surrendered his freedom of action . . .
46.
47.
48.

334 U.S. 219, 246 (1947).
Id. at 236.
272 U.S. 359 (1926).

49. See idt at 361-62.
50. Id. at 362-63.
51. Id. at 364.
In their brief to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs in Anderson did in fact allege an effect on
product market competition, arguing that collusive monopsony in the labor market "would eventually lessen the standard of efficiency" of employers. Brief for Petitioners at 79, Anderson (No.
306). But they provided no special facts to support this allegation, which simply appears to
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In holding that the Sherman Act's prohibition on restraints in interstate commerce extended to a cartel of California refiners accused
of artificially lowering the price paid to California sugar beet growers,
the Mandeville Court explained that "Congress' power to keep the
interstate market free of goods produced under conditions inimical to
the general welfare may be exercised in individual cases without
showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce. '52 This passage
underscores the Court's accurate assessment that the Sherman Act reflects the collective judgment of Americans across the country that
they did not wish to tolerate the interstate sale of refined sugar if that
sugar was produced by collusive methods that exploited California
farmers. These sales were intolerable because of the oppressive or
unfair nature of the collusion, regardless
of any ultimate effect on the
53
price of sugar in the grocery store.
The economic effects of the collusion challenged in Mandeville
appear similar in several important respects to the effects of blanket

restraints in sports. It is certainly true that the agreement in Mandeville involved naked collusion, whereas blanket restraints are simply
among a host of agreements among sports team owners, many of them
necessary for the sports to exist. But this distinction justifies consideration of the owners' justifications for their agreements under the rule
of reason, not a finding that the agreements are beyond the scope of
the Sherman Act.5 4 Both involve collusion by buyers; both involve
sellers who have few alternatives and an "inelastic supply curve";"
and the salary caps and luxury taxes, as well as the beet cartel, use
somewhat complex means of price setting, including a formula based

on the conspirators' joint profits.56 Nevertheless, nothing in the
Court's opinion in Mandeville suggests that the specific characteristics
presage the Court's observation in Mandeville, 334 U.S. at 242, that monopsony inherently leads
to inefficiency. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
52. Mandeville, 334 U.S. at 236 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941)

(upholding congressional power to keep goods made wholly within one state under objectionable labor conditions out of the stream of interstate commerce)).
53. Cf Allied Corp., 101 F.T.C. 721, 724-25 (1983) (over lone dissent by Chairman Miller,

FTC refused to approve a merger, despite the Bureau of Economics's objection that demand for
the product was so great among immediate purchasers that even a 10% increase in price resulting from the merger would not reduce the number of purchases).
54. Cf.NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101, 103 (1984).

55. Sugar beets have one single use (refining into sugar); they must be marketed immediately after harvesting to a geographically proximate employer; they are grown only in widely
scattered regions specially suited to the crop's soil, climate, and water needs; and economies of
scale effectively precluded forward economic integration by farmers through cooperatives. See
Mandeville, 334 U.S. at 239 nn.20-21.
56. In Mandeville, a key factor in the formula determining the price of beets was the joint

average net return from beets sold from the defendants' California factories. See American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Mandeville Island Farms; 195 F.2d 622, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1952). Likewise, the
schemes employed by all major sports except the NHL prohibit or discourage teams from paying
salaries that exceed a dollar amount calculated as a percentage of the league's gross revenues
from designated sources of income. See supra note 4.
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of the agreement challenged there distinguishes it from any other
buyer cartel.
In Mandeville, the Court did declare that it was "inconceivable
that the monopoly.., will have no effects for the lessening of competition in the later interstate phases of the over-all activity, '5 7 and that
the "idea that stabilization of prices paid for the only raw material
consumed in an industry has no influence toward reducing competition in the distribution of the finished product, in an integrated industry such as this, is impossible to accept."58 But the only specific
example of downstream economic impact offered by the Court was
that the pricing formula deprived the grower of the "advantage of the
individual efficiency of the refiner with which he deals."59 The Court
also noted that the complaint (taken as true at this stage of the proceedings) alleged "upon information and belief" that, as a result of the
collusive pricing formula, the defendant "did not conduct its interstate
operations as carefully and efficiently as previously."6 Such inefficiencies are likely, however, in almost all cases where firms are relieved of the competitive pressure to compete in the purchase of
inputs. Rather than suggesting that Mandeville is a special case of
buyer collusion that was output- or welfare-reducing, the Court's discussion and the facts of the case suggest that harm in downstream
markets is either something that antitrust plaintiffs need not prove or
is a necessary tendency of all buyer cartels and thus can be assumed.
In several more recent appellate court cases, buyer cartels were
held per se illegal even though facts suggested an inelastic supply
curve and there was no evidence that the cartel had affected output.
For example, in Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co. ,61 the
defendants divided geographic areas within the Tongass National Forest for purposes of bidding for timber-logging rights. Because the federal government set a minimum bid, the amount of timber logged was
unaffected by the scheme; the sole result of the agreement was to
lower the'rights fees paid to the U.S. Treasury. The Ninth Circuit had
little difficulty finding an antitrust violation, yet under the crabbed
view of the Sherman Act urged by sports league defenders, this practice would not be covered by the antitrust laws.62
57. Mandeville, 334 U.S. at 240.
58. Id. at 241.
59. Id. at 242. The plaintiffs in this case all had contracts with the most efficient of the
three conspirators, so they would have made more money if the pricing formula depended on

their own purchaser's net return, rather than a joint net return.
60. it&
at 226.
61.

699 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1983).

62. See also United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that logging cartel violated Sherman Act even absent evidence of specific intent to fix
prices, as "measured by the substantiality of the interstate commerce which is touched by the
restraint").
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If, therefore, collusive monopsony is generally illegal even when
the supply of goods or services is sufficiently inelastic that there is no
short-run effect on output, there remains the argument that restraints
in the labor market are peculiarly beyond Sherman Act purview. Advocates of this position63 rely on language in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.' In rejecting a claim that
unionized workers had conspired to restrain trade, Justice Stone's majority opinion observed that the Court had never applied the Sherman
Act absent "some form of restraint upon commercial competition in
the marketing of goods or services. '"65 As Professor Goldman observes, if this phrase were followed literally, court decisions proscribing a host of unreasonable restraints that do not involve the marketing
of goods and services would be in jeopardy.' Goldman persuasively
argues that this language "merely limit[s] section 1 coverage to restraints on competition among business competitors, whether in input
or output markets and exclud[es] restraints among or by labor unless
labor's restraint was intended to or did affect competition (not merely
prices) in the product market."67
63. The argument discussed in the text is different from one detailed in Gary R. Roberts,
Reconciling FederalLabor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19 (1986). In that article, Roberts makes two principal points in
support of his conclusion that sports league restraints that reduce competition in the labor market are not subject to attack under § 1 of the Sherman Act. See id. at 96-98. First, he argues that
the text and legislative history of § 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988), precludes Sherman Act coverage of any labor restraint because labor is declared not to be a "commodity or
article of commerce." Id. at 26. Second, he argues that the judicially implied "nonstatutory"
labor exemption should completely preclude Sherman Act coverage. See id. at 58. Both these
arguments are sharply contested. See Goldman, supra note 39, at 635-79.
The existence of a collective bargaining relationship between players and a league does
affect the owners' antitrust liability for labor market restraints. See supra note 10. The application of this "labor exemption" doctrine to sports leagues is a complex and controversial issue
that deserves separate treatment and is beyond the scope of this article. Although Roberts
raises the separate point that the Clayton Act's enactment in 1914 created an exemption for
labor market restraints irrespective of the existence of collective bargaining, see Roberts, supra,
at 86-88, that argument is so related to the collective bargaining issue that it is best considered
within that context.
64. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
65. Id. at 495.
66. See Goldman, supra note 39, at 631 & n.72 (citing cases).
In Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957), the Supreme Court reinstated an antitrust
complaint filed by a player subject to an NFL boycott because he had played in a rival league.
The Court remanded for further proceedings, reversing the lower court's judgment that football
was exempt from antitrust scrutiny by analogy to the Court's baseball rulings. See id. at 450-52.
Among the arguments raised by the NFL in its defense was the claim, citing Apex Hosiery, that
restraints on employee services were not subject to the Sherman Act. See Brief for Respondents
at 61, Radovich (No. 56-94). This argument was presumably among those covered by the Court's
observation that the NFL's "remaining contentions we believe to be lacking in merit." 352 U.S.
at 454.
67. Goldman, supra note 39, at 631.
The fact that Anderson was decided prior to Apex Hosiery, and reinstated a complaint filed
by a seaman that did not allege any direct harm in a product market, see supra text accompanying notes 47-49, would seem to support Professor Goldman's interpretation of Justice Stone's
comment that the Court had never applied the Sherman Act absent a "restraint on commercial
competition."
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Indeed, the court of appeals in Mackey v. NFL68 expressly distinguished Apex Hosiery as condoning restrictions on competition for
employee services imposed by employees themselves, not employers.
The lower courts have consistently recognized that labor market restraints are within the reach of the antitrust laws without any proof of
a direct effect on some downstream product market. 69 Thus, there is
no basis to exclude labor markets from the "Magna Carta of free enterprise."7 Indeed, in light of the social policy expressed in the National Labor Relations Act, which acknowledges the unfair and
unequal distribution of bargaining power between workers and employers, it can hardly be thought that federal policy would permit employer conspiracies that restrain competition and exacerbate this
disadvantage. 7 In sum, there is no basis for failing to apply the genCourts and commentators who have focused on the issue of unions' antitrust liability have
occasionally used broad language that might seem to support the argument that the Sherman
Act ought not be applied to employer restraints in labor markets. For example, Archibald Cox
wrote in Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A PreliminaryAnalysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252, 254
(1955), that "[n]o one seriously suggests that antitrust policy should be concerned with the labor
market per se." However, the remainder of Cox's article never discusses employer antitrust
liability. Indeed, Cox's proposal for a statutory amendment to deal with some of the problems
he discusses is couched entirely in terms of liability and protection for unions. See id. at 284
n.117.
Some courts have exempted from antitrust scrutiny behavior by unions or a multiemployer
bargaining group in the context of collective bargaining, under an interpretation of § 6 of the
Clayton Act necessitated by the desire to harmonize the antitrust laws and the National Labor
Relations Act. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133, 136
(8th Cir. 1979) (stating that courts must balance interference with labor policy and magnitude of
restraint of trade and effect on consuming public). Other cases have rejected antitrust challenges
to multiemployer agreements concerning tactics used in labor disputes, as distinct from agreements that reduced competition in the labor market itself. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 319 F.2d 366, 372-73 (2d Cir. 1963). The requisite accommodation of the federal antitrust and labor policies is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that the mere fact that
the Sherman Act's policies have to be accommodated assumes that the scope of the antitrust
laws is broad enough to encompass labor restraints.
68. 543 F.2d 606, 617 (8th Cir. 1976).
69. See, e.g., Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 544 (10th Cir. 1995); Powell v.
NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1298 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 118389 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 616-18 (8th Cir. 1976); Gardella v. Chandler,
172 F.2d 402, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J., concurring); see also Law v. NCAA, 902 F.
Supp. 1394, 1402, 1405 & n.11 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that collegiate athletic association rule
fixing salaries for coaches violates § 1 of the Sherman Act).
70. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
71. See Goldman, supra note 39, at 625-26. For related arguments as to why the common
law should treat employer conspiracies to restrain trade more harshly than worker restraints in
the labor market, see Stephen F. Ross, The Evolving Tort of Conspiracy to Restrain Trade Under
Canadian Common Law, 75 CAN. BAR REV. 193 (1996).
There is a very early American case, The Master Stevedores' Ass'n v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1, 13,
(N.Y. Ct. Com. Pls. 1867), where the court in dicta wrote that the common law of restraint of
trade did not preclude employers from agreeing on wages. The court's actual holding, however,
concerned the ability of workers to jointly agree not to work except at agreed-upon wages, and
the court cited no authority expressly holding that employers were permitted to cartelize the
labor market. See id. Moreover, the common law of restraint of trade, as far as it is relevant for
Sherman Act purposes, continues to evolve. See generally Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1988) (refusing to adopt pre-1890 precedent in holding that vertical
restraint of trade is not per se illegal under Sherman Act § 1). By 1887 it was clear that the
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eral rule established in NCAA for sports leagues to the specific labor
market restraints implicated by a league's adoption of a blanket
restraint.
B.

The Exclusive Legitimacy of Competitive Balance as a
Justificationfor Blanket Restraints of Trade Among
ProfessionalSports Leagues72

In NCAA, the Supreme Court set out the analytical framework
for sports league agreements, establishing a two-part test to examine
the league's justifications once the plaintiff had established the existence of a significant restraint on competition. The Court's test inquires, first, whether the league's purported justifications are
legitimate and, second, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary
to achieve the league's goals.7 3 In applying that test to the facts of the
NCAA case, the Court wrote: "Petitioner argues that the interest in
maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic teams is
legitimate and important and that it justifies the regulations challenged in this case. We agree with the first part of the argument but
not the second." 74 The Court therefore concluded that the NCAA's
imposition of significant restrictions on the sale of television rights
was not reasonably tailored to promote equalized competition and
was thus unreasonable.7 5 The Court's opinion correctly suggests that
the rule of reason allows owners to enter into agreements having the
effect of significantly restricting competition in the player market in
order to promote competitive balance.76 In so doing, the Court endorsed the better-reasoned approach to competitive balance adopted
by some lower courts. In Mackey v. NFL, for example, the Eighth
Circuit held that "the NFL has a strong and unique interest in maincommon law barred employers from setting wages. Cf., e.g., Mineral Water Bottle Exch. &
Trade Protection Soc'y v. Booth, 36 Ch. D. 465, 469 (C.A. 1887) (holding that common law

proscribed trade association rule barring members from hiring employees of other members). In
light of the legislative history demonstrating that the Sherman Act was broadly intended to proscribe all oppressive economic combinations, see supra notes 39-41, there is no justification for
relying on a case from more than a century and a half ago that appears to have been outdated by

the time the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890.
72. The blanket restraints on which this article focuses involve completely separate issues
from those raised by league agreements designed to preserve the integrity of the sport. Even in
the Warren Court era, the heyday of rules of per se illegality, courts permitted leagues to
completely refuse to deal with players guilty of gambling or similar misconduct. See, e.g.,
Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Maintaining the integrity of the game is,
of course, a valid justification for tailored trade restraints, but the owners have never suggested it

as an argument for blanket restraints.
73.
74.

See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102-03 (1984).
Id. at 117.

75. See id. at 117-19.
76. See also Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 818 (D. Minn. 1988) (Doty, J.) (concluding
that "[t]he danger that destruction of the competitive balance could ultimately lead to dimin-

ished spectator interest and franchise failures itself constitutes a sufficient basis" for denying
preliminary relief that would have created complete free agency in football).
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taining competitive balance among its teams," 7 although it then sustained the district court's finding that the free agency restrictions
challenged in that case were unreasonable because they were overly
restrictive and thus not essential to maintaining that balance. FollowDistrict Judge David Doty instructed the jury
ing NCAA and Mackey,
in McNeil v. NFL78 that, if they found that the free agency restraints
at issue there substantially harmed competition in the bidding for
player services, the burden would then shift to the league to show that
the restraints were "reasonably necessary" to achieve competitive
balance. 79
This approach is sound for, as Judge Doty explained to the McNeil jury, NFL teams must have "sufficiently comparable playing
strength that football fans will be in enough doubt about the probable
outcome of each game and of the various division races that they will
be interested in watching the games. ' 80 In other words, competitive
balance is procompetitive and thus a legitimate justification for a
trade restraint because it actually increases output: additional fans
will attend games or watch them on television, and existing fans will
get more enjoyment from the games, if they take place within the context of a close championship race. 81
77. 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976).
78. McNeil v. NFL, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,982, at 68,768 (D. Minn. 1992).
79. Id. at 68,771-772.
A Michigan district court reviewing an earlier challenge to a National Hockey League restriction also followed Mackey, accepting competitive balance as a legitimate justification, but
finding the restraint at issue to be overbroad and thus unreasonable. See McCourt v. California
Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904, 909-10 (E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 600 F.2d 1193
(6th Cir. 1979). The court of appeals reversed the district court's finding that the restraint had
been unilaterally imposed by the NHL, finding instead that it had been agreed to by the NHL
Players Association and was thus protected by the labor exemption. See supra note 10. Thus,
the Sixth Circuit did not have the opportunity to consider the merits of the antitrust analysis.
Mackey was presaged by several insightful district court opinions. One, written by Judge
Leon Higginbotham (formerly a member of the Federal Trade Commission), found that player
restraints could be justified by the "need for competitive balance within the league." Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462,486 (E.D. Pa.
1972); see also Boris v. USFL, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,012, at 68,462 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(finding that USFL's myriad justifications for refusing to sign college football players with remaining years of collegiate eligibility, one of which was competitive balance, had "varying degrees of merit," but concluding that the practice was unreasonable because it was principally
based on a desire to comply with the demands of college football coaches).
An even earlier decision, United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953), recognized that sports leagues are legitimately concerned with competitive balance, especially newer
leagues, like the NFL at the time, whose teams are frequently close to financial failure. The
court concluded that this concern was sufficient to justify an agreement that prevented a team
from televising its games in another geographical area when to do so would compete with the
home games of the local team in that area. See id. at 325. However, the court found that competitive balance concerns did not justify a restraint on competing telecasts when the local team
was playing an away game. See id. at 326.
80. McNeil, 1992-2 Trade Cas. at 68,771.
81. Economists Henry Demmert and Roger Noll have independently demonstrated empirically that attendance increases when championship races are closely contested. See HENRY G.
DEMMERT, Tim ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 10-11 (1973); Roger G. Noll, At-
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The approach followed in these cases compares favorably to that
taken by the District of Columbia Circuit in Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc.,82 in rejecting competitive balance as a legitimate defense under
the rule of reason because balance-promoting rules did not encourage
new firms to enter the market or existing firms to offer their product
at a lower price.83 Although market entry and cost reduction are certainly desirable from a consumer perspective, the court's view is too
restrictive, for it ignores the real possibility that a restriction that is
reasonably necessary to achieve competitive balance will enable existing firms to offer a superior product (exciting games and division
races) at the same cost. Indeed, the television restrictions at issue in
NCAA did not encourage new schools to field college football teams
and did not lower the costs of operation for member schools. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court suggested that the restrictions would have
been found reasonable under the antitrust laws if they had been
shown to promote competitive balance.'
Another objection to permitting sports leagues to impose player
restraints in the interest of promoting competitive balance is that it
tendance and Price Setting, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 115, 156-57 (Roger G.
Noll ed., 1974).
Others have correctly pointed out that competitive balance is only one feature that makes a
professional league sport attractive to fans. For example, minor leagues with high rates of player
turnover enjoy more long-term competitive balance than the major leagues but have less spectator appeal. See

MICHAEL

J.

TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE

226

(1986). Amenities, ease of access to stadia, the availability of substitute forms of sporting or
other entertainment, weather, and income also affect attendance. See Noll, supra, at 115-20.
82. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
83. Although the court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the NFL draft
was overly restrictive and did not seem to have achieved the goal of competitive balance, see id.
at 1183, it went on to note: "[T]he draft, while it may heighten athletic competition and thus
improve the entertainment product offered to the public, does not increase competition in the
economic sense of encouraging others to enter the market and to offer the product at lower
cost." Id. at 1186.
84. In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996), the court considered and
rejected the argument that NCAA "undermined, if not vitiated" Smith, but its attempt to distinguish NCAA is unpersuasive. The court noted that amateur college football would cease to exist
without restrictions on player eligibility and academic requirements, whereas the salary restraints on certain football players challenged in Brown "cannot be said to be vital to the preservation of professional football." Id. at 239. The problem with this analysis was that the NCAA's
academic and eligibility restrictions were not at issue in the case; it was about television broadcasting. No one contended that the television restrictions were vital to the preservation of the
sport; rather, the NCAA's claim was that they made the sport a better product. This claim,
which was credited by the Supreme Court in theory but rejected on the facts of the NCAA case,
is the same as the one the NFL made in Smith.
The Supreme Court's unequivocal statement in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117
(1984), that "maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic teams is legitimate"
must also be read in the context of the lower court decisions in that case. Both the district judge
and a majority of the court of appeals had held, similar to Smith, that restrictions necessary to
promote balanced competition were not permitted under the antitrust laws because competitive
balance was a "noneconomic justification" that "shades into the argument that competition will
destroy the market." Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1983), affg 546
F. Supp. 1276, 1310 (W.D. Okla. 1982), affd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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allows courts to prefer benefits to consumers over harm to workers.85
Notwithstanding language in some Supreme Court opinions that could
be read to proscribe restraints in one "market" even if they make the
sport more attractive to fans, the NCAA standard, as applied to professional sports in Mackey, correctly considers competitive balance as
a legitimate defense for a host of reasons.
As an initial matter, almost any restraint of trade, no matter how
reasonable, is bound to harm some consumers and benefit others; the
essence of the common-law doctrine of ancillary restraints, which has
been incorporated into Sherman Act analysis since Addyston Pipe,8 6
requires judges to weigh the interests of both parties as well as the
interests of the public. Suppose, to use a hypothetical, that Sally Starbuck developed a great blend of coffee and a patented espresso
machine and opened a coffee house with a likeable, yuppie atmosphere in Seattle. Suppose that Sally then sold her operation to a publicly traded corporation, and, ancillary thereto, agreed not to compete
with them for five years. Suppose further that, as often happens, the
quality of the product was maintained, at a lower price, but that the
atmosphere became a bit more "corporate" and thus less attractive to
the original patrons in Seattle. They would prefer that Sally open a
new coffee house and therefore are injured by the agreement not to
compete. Nevertheless, if the noncompete agreement is reasonably
necessary to effectuate the sale to Starbucks, Inc., and if the publicly
traded company has the capital to allow for a nationwide expansion,
millions more consumers will benefit. Accordingly, the common law
(and the Sherman Act) would consider the arrangement reasonable.
Although the Supreme Court has occasionally used language that
may seem to suggest a contrary conclusion, a review of the Court's
antitrust jurisprudence shows that quality-enhancing agreements are
reasonable even if they make some parties worse off. For example, in
United States v. Topco Associates,87 the Supreme Court wrote that
only Congress, through a statutory exemption to the antitrust laws,
could decide "to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy
for greater competition in another portion."' Yet in that case, which
challenged unnecessary8 9 restraints on membership in a grocery cooperative, neither the Court nor the government questioned the legiti85.

Because Senator Sherman, like subsequent courts and economists, was skeptical that

savings from labor costs would be passed on to consumers, sports leagues may not use the
NCAA standard to justify paying lower salaries on the grounds that to do so will result in lower

ticket prices. See supra note 41. A comprehensive review of the economics of baseball argues
that baseball owners will set prices in order to maximize revenue and their costs-such as salaries-are ignored in this calculation. See ANDREw ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONs 53

(1992).
86. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
87. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
88. Id. at 611.
89. See Ross, supra note 37, at 154.
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macy of cooperative buying by the grocers participating in the Topco
organization. Cooperative buying produces efficiencies for consumers
by lowering the marginal cost of the retailers' products, 90 even though
there are always some "victims" in another market-the firms who
previously had sold to one or more of the cooperatives' participants,
who suffer as a result of the increased buying power that the retailers
are able to exercise by making joint purchases.
Similarly, in BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSys-.
tern, 91 the Supreme Court used the rule of reason analysis to determine the reasonableness of a blanket license "discriminatorily" priced
based on ability to pay that was offered by BMI, a joint venture of
copyrighted music owners. Some consumers, most notably, CBS and
the others who were willing to spend a fortune in legal fees to challenge BMI's practices, would have been better off if the blanket license had been disallowed, but the Court rejected their arguments,
relying on the significant efficiencies and benefits to taverns, small radio stations, and others who prefer to purchase a single blanket
license. 92
Here again, the need to democratically interpret the Sherman
Act becomes apparent. The argument against the NCAA standard is
that an agreement necessary to enable a sports league to offer exciting
championship races should nonetheless be invalidated because it has
an adverse effect on some players, whose fortunes would be better
served in a completely unrestrained market. But it is highly doubtful
that the voters who elected the 51st Congress in 1890, or the 105th
Congress in 1997, would prefer such an anticonsumer result. Absent
strong evidence that the Sherman Act represented a victory for labor's raw political power over the interests of the consumer/majority,
90.
91.
92.

For an illustration, see BEAm & HARPISON, supra note 30, at 95.
441 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1979).
See id. at 21-22. The Court in United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank, 374 U.S.

321, 370-71 (1963), rejected the defendants' contention that they should be allowed to merge in
order to enhance the competition for large business accounts between themselves and banks in
New York, even though their merger would reduce competition in the Philadelphia market. This

case is distinguishable from the proposition discussed in text for several reasons. First, the Court
noted that those consumers most likely to benefit from the merger (large Philadelphia firms who
found the banks' pre-merger lending limits to be inadequate) could "readily" obtain loans elsewhere. Id. at 371. Thus, there was no real benefit to any group of consumers. Second, the Court
indicated that it was rejecting the concept of "countervailing power," id. at 370 (citing KieferStewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213-14 (1951) (rejecting price fixing
by sellers based on need to defend selves against buyer cartel)), and therefore it is not clear that
the Court was contemplating a practice like cooperative buying. Third, the Court expressly indicated that two small firms in a market should be allowed to merge in order to compete more

successfully with the leading firms, see id. at 370-71, even though it is likely that some consumers
(i.e., those who preferred the services of the acquired firm or who considered the two merging
firms close substitutes for each other) might be injured. Finally, PhiladelphiaNational Bank was

a merger case governed by § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, which prohibits mergers that
substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce. See PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, 374 U.S.

at 355 (emphasis added). In contrast, sports litigation takes place under the Sherman Act's more
general prohibition of unreasonable "restraints of trade."
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courts should adhere to a standard that weighs the public interest
against the interest of affected parties. The best way to do this is via
the test set out in the NCAA case, which permits joint agreements
among buyers with monopsony power, but only when the benefits of
are "unobtainable in the absence of monopsony
their agreement
93
power.

Although improving competitive balance is therefore a goal that
should be recognized as a valid reason for imposing player restraints,
other justifications have not met with judicial favor. Thus, courts have
refused to allow owners to justify player restrictions on the grounds
that requiring teams to compete with each other would lead to "ruinous competition" or that a team needs to exercise monopsony power
over a player for a certain period of time in order to recoup its investment in developing the player's skills. Courts have held that there is
nothing unique about sports leagues--comparable to the leagues' specialized need for competitive balance-that would justify permitting
them to raise these defenses. 94
Raising the specter of ruinous competition, some economists
have suggested that salary caps may be necessary to preserve the
"maximum number of teams" in a league, because higher salaries may
cause marginal franchises to fail.9 5 However, almost every cartel can
plausibly claim that setting a fixed monopsony/monopoly price enables marginal firms to remain in business. The Sherman Act no more
permits a league to ensure a high number of viable franchises through
collusion to hold down salaries than it would permit the steel companies to fix the price of wages or coal in order to permit failing rivals to
stay in business. 96 Similarly, league officials have suggested that providing potential investors with "cost certainty" justifies the practice of
jointly setting salaries.97 In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,98 the
93. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Cooperative Buying, Monopsony Power, and
Antitrust Policy, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 331, 340 (1992).

94. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976). See generally United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,221 (1940) (holding that fear of "[r]uinous competition" is
not a justification for price fixing).
95. Glen Seredynski et al., On Team Relocation, League Expansion, and Public Policy: Or,
Where Do We Put This Hockey Franchiseand Why Would You Care?,4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
663, 698 (1994).
96. Significantly, the economists cited in note 95, supra, suggest that leagues agree with
their players on a salary cap in order to increase the number of teams and thus jobs for players.
See id. at 698. Unions often face a trade-off between more jobs and higher wages, and players'
unions are free to opt for the former. If they reach a collective bargain with the owners to this
effect, the salary cap would be insulated from antitrust attack. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954,
958-59 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979); see
also supra note 10. Absent such an agreement, however, the general principles discussed in the
text apply.
97. Declaration of Russell T. Granik 1 42, NBA v. Williams, 94 Civ. 4488 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
The claim that courts should recognize a special antitrust defense because sports leagues
need to attract investors who require "cost certainty" is particularly inappropriate when used to
justify restraints in the labor market. If, in fact, a sports league can make a persuasive case that
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Supreme Court rejected the argument that rival beer wholesalers
should be able to agree to offer uniform terms of credit to retailers on
the grounds that these terms tended to facilitate entry of smaller
firms. The Court concluded that every cartel can claim that its activities make entry or investment more attractive. 99
The district court's analysis in Linseman v. World Hockey
Ass'n' 0 0 provides a good illustration of the principle that sports
leagues may justify restraints only with arguments based on the special aspects of the sport that demand coordinated behavior. In finding
that the WHA's rule barring teams from signing players under twenty
years of age violated the Sherman Act, the court initially noted that
"there is no reason to believe that collective action is required by the
industry structure in order to determine who should be permitted to
play professional hockey," as opposed to leaving those decisions to
each individual team "under our free market system."'' 1 The court
contrasted hockey's structure with that of professional golf, where collective action to limit participation in the principal men's tour is necessary because of the limited time available to play tournaments. 0 2
Next, the court found that there was no valid purpose for the age ban.
The court noted that the WHA's "major thrust" was that it had been
coerced into adopting the rule because of a blacklist by Canadian national hockey authorities that would result in a boycott by foreign
teams of planned international competition. The court concluded that
acquiescence of this sort was not a defense.' 0 3 Finally, the court rejected the argument that the ban was necessary to preserve Canadian
junior league teams, who allegedly would fail if the most talented
teenagers were signed by professional teams. If the Canadian junior
leagues provided essential training for prospective players, the court
observed, the WHA could devise a means, at its own cost, for setting
up that training. 0 4 Although the court did not expound upon this
point, if the Canadian junior league teams would not be financially
overall league output and profitability will increase with an infusion of capital from investors
requiring cost certainty, the league can enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its
players to provide such certainty. Such an agreement would, as noted previously, be exempt
from antitrust scrutiny because of the labor exemption. Indeed, this seems to be precisely what
the National Basketball Association was able to do in 1982 when it first persuaded its players to
accept a salary cap as part of its collective bargaining agreement. See Interview with David Stern,
NBA Commissioner, ANTITRUST, Summer 1987, at 27.
98. 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980).
99. See id. at 649.
100. 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
101. Id. at 1321.
102. See id. (distinguishing Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.
1996)).
103. See id. at 1321-22 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 161
(1948)); see also Boris v. USFL, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,012, at 68,461 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(finding agreement not to sign players with remaining collegiate eligibility unjustified because
based on desire to appease college football coaches).
104. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1322.
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viable without teenagers talented enough to play major professional
hockey, then the WHA and its rival, the NHL, could provide financial
subsidies to keep the junior leagues afloat. But, as the court noted,
"the Sherman Act does not permit a failing enterprise
to be buoyed
10 5
up with an illegal agreement to restrain trade.'
Linseman's sound analysis contrasts with the district court's opinion in Nassau Sports v. Peters,1° 6 the one anomalous reported decision
suggesting that sports leagues may justify substantial player restraints
based on the "need for some form of protective system to insure the
recoupment of investments-often large-made both to develop and
to acquire talented players."'" 7 The holding that rivals can agree to
reduce competition in order to recoup their individual investments
(which, to be fair to the judge, was rendered hastily in the context of a
motion for a preliminary injunction) is inconsistent with the general
tradition of the antitrust laws. Consider, for example, Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC. °8 In that case, the Supreme Court
upheld the FTC's order barring fashion designers from implementing
a host of procedures designed to prevent "style pirates" from copying
original dress designs (which, for technical reasons, could not be patented or copyrighted). 10 9 If dress designers cannot act collusively to
ensure that their investment in original clothing designs can be
"recouped," there is little justification for allowing employers, even of
talented players, to do so. As the court observed in Mackey v. NFL,
these expenses are ordinary costs of doing business and, unlike the
need to foster competitive balance, are not peculiar to professional
sports leagues." 0
Ultimately, the judicial rejection of an investment recoupment
defense rests on the empirical judgment that horizontal restraints are
unnecessary to ensure adequate training and development of skilled
personnel. Many industries (law is one) invest heavily in talented personnel without any guarantee that they will not leave after a short
period of time."' Where a player is truly unique, and a team needs to
create a long-term relationship in order to make desired investments,

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1322.
352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 879.
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
See id. at 457.
See 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976).
See Inquiry into Professional Sports: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on

Prof'lSports, 94th Cong. 356 (1976) (testimony of Major League Baseball Players' Association
executive director Marvin Miller).
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112 Colluit is free to negotiate a long-term 3contract with that player.
sive monopsony is not required."
Yet another theoretically plausible justification for blanket restraints is that sports leagues maximize fan interest not by achieving
competitive balance but by ensuring that teams in the most popular
markets are always contending for the championship. As Professor
Roger Noll explains, parity
is not in the financial interest of a league. Instead, leagues want
sufficient uncertainty of outcomes to keep all fans interested-a
far cry from having every team have an equal chance of winning a
league championship. A good team will do better financially and
broadcast
contribute more to the value
114 of a league's national
package if it is in a big city.
It is true that economic welfare "will be enhanced by having the
Yankees and the Mets dominate baseball even if it makes the (fewer)
people in Milwaukee or Seattle worse off,""' 5 but economic welfare
will be enhanced even more if the Yankees and Mets participate disproportionately in the World Series while, over the same period, the
Brewers and Mariners appear to have a reasonable chance to contend
for the championship within a few years. The precise level of competitive balance that optimizes consumer welfare, however, is a complex
determination that is beyond the scope of this article.
In any event, blanket restraints are not arguably tailored to
achieve this goal. The Chicago Bulls, for example, do not need the
salary cap to maintain their talent because NBA salary cap rules allow
them to re-sign their current players. On the other hand, the oncepopular Los Angeles Lakers are restricted in their efforts to return to
prominence by the limits on their ability to acquire top veteran players. Indeed, blanket restraints are a perverse way of ensuring that
112. Cf.Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240,243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (enjoining basketball star Rick Barry from joining team in rival basketball league until he had discharged contract
responsibilities with plaintiff Golden State Warriors). For an analysis rejecting arguments that
horizontal agreements are necessary to develop baseball players through the minor leagues, see
Ross I, supra note 36, at 693-95 (arguing that in a free market most players will sign multiyear
contracts to allow recoupment of development costs).
113. It is important to recall that Nassau Sports was decided in 1972, shortly after Major
League Baseball had persuaded the Supreme Court that the reserve clause was so essential to its
game that an incorrect and anomalous antitrust exemption was extended. See Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258 (1972). For an analysis of how Flood's underlying precepts, especially the notion
that reserve clauses were essential to the game, have been disproved by subsequent events (most
notably, baseball's huge success since 1976 despite vigorous free agency), see Ross, supra note 9.
114. Roger G. Noll, Professional Basketball: Economic and Business Perspectives, in THE
BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 18, 33-34 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds.,
1991); see also Rodney Fort & James Quirk, Cross-subsidization,Incentives, and Outcomes in
Professional Team Sports Leagues, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1265, 1291 (1995) (stating that the
"fact that TV audiences (and advertising income) are larger when big city teams participate in
playoffs and championship series provides profit incentives for a league to adopt policies that
promote less competitive balance").
115. John J. Siegfried, Book Review, 57 S. ECON. J. 580 (1990) (reviewing GERALD W.
SCULLY, THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (1989)).
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teams in large markets predominate. Regardless of their locale, superior teams do not need the free agent market in order to succeed; their
rosters already have the requisite talent. Franchises from markets
where consumers do not respond to wins significantly enough to justify substantial free agent spending will not spend the money, irrespective of the existence of blanket restraints. Thus, the only clubs that
are effectively limited by a blanket restraint are inferior teams from
large or demand-sensitive markets-the New York Mets, for example.
In fact, baseball's experience has shown that free agency is a better
mechanism to achieve a mix of competitive balance with disproportionate participation by big-city teams; one study showed that free
agents in baseball tended to migrate to large markets and to inferior
squads.116 To date, then, competitive balance remains the only purpose that has been recognized as sufficient to justify blanket
restraints
17
on competition for player services by sports leagues."
Still, simply invoking the mantra "competitive balance" will not
result in a judicial finding that a sports league's trade restraint is reasonable. To justify significant trade restraints, the two-part test set
forth by the Supreme Court in NCAA requires both that the defendants show that their goal is legitimate and that the chosen restraint is
reasonably necessary to the goal's achievement. In NCAA, for example, the Supreme Court held that the collegiate athletic association
had failed to meet the "heavy burden""' 8 borne by defendants whose
agreements significantly restrain competition, because the restriction
116. David A. Besanko & Daniel Simon, Resource Allocation in the Baseball Player's Labor
Market. An Empirical Investigation, REv. Bus. & ECON. REs., Fall 1985, at 71.
117. In NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 115 n.55 (1984), the Supreme Court suggested that where a sports league faced "'interbrand' competition from available substitutes,

then certain forms of collective action might be appropriate in order to enhance its ability to
compete." The Court's analysis of the NCAA's market power in college football, see id. at 11113, would suggest that the current major sports leagues could not avail themselves of this
defense.
It is by no means clear that the Court had blanket restraints in mind in offering this suggestion. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-57 (1977), the Supreme
Court approved the use of nonprice restraints on product distribution by a firm with a tiny
market share. To the extent that a league faced the sort of interbrand competition that Sylvania

did in the television manufacturing market, intraleague limits on competition for player services
would arguably not even constitute a significant trade restraint, because of the ability of players
to receive competitive offers from rival leagues.
Even where interleague rivalry might appear to justify more serious player restraints, the
better course would be to rely on the league to persuade its players of the necessity of the
restraint so it would be protected from antitrust challenge under the labor exemption. See supra

note 97. The danger in allowing a labor restraint that does not improve the quality of the product for consumers, but simply promotes competition by lowering costs, is that this justification
could be invoked by every employer in a competitive industry. Thus, to take a strong case,
consider a new football league that sought to justify a rigid salary cap as necessary to (1) attract
investors and (2) ensure that some of its members do not overspend in hopes of transferring its
franchise to the dominant NFL. To the extent that these concerns had merit, a union representing the league's players should be willing to accept these restraints in a collective bargaining

agreement.
118.

468 U.S. at 113.
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on the sale of college football television rights at issue in that case was
not "even arguably tailored" to serve the asserted interest in promoting competitive balance. 119 Thus, the NCAA case did not expressly
address how a stronger claim by a sports league might be evaluated.
As I have detailed elsewhere, however, the proper approach to any
rule of reason case is to hold unreasonable those restrictions that are
broader than reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate goals outlined by the defendant. 20 This approach has been a critical element
of antitrust jurisprudence since 1898, when Judge William Howard
Taft wrote the landmark opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. 21 In that case, Taft held that the Sherman Act was intended
to make criminal and tortious those contracts that were void as unreasonable restraints of trade under the common law and concluded that
the common law tolerated restraints among competitors only when
"ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to
protect the22covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the
contract.'
Antitrust cases involving sports league trade restraints have consistently applied the same standard. On two occasions, the NFL's amateur draft has been found illegal because "it went beyond the level of
restraint reasonably necessary to accomplish whatever legitimate business purposes might be asserted for it.'1 23 In its opinion in Smith v.
119. Id. at 119.
120. See generally Ross, supra note 37, at 121-43; Ross 1,supra note 36, at 489-97.
In Chicago ProfessionalSports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996), Judge Frank
Easterbrook suggested that the test enunciated in NCAA was not an exposition of the application of the rule of reason toward evaluating whether a sports league joint venture's ancillary
restraints were permissible, but was instead an unprecedented invocation of a "bobtailed Rule of
Reason." The high degree of economic integration among members of a sports league requires,
in his judgment, a "full Rule of Reason" where proof of substantial market power is "an indispensable ingredient." Id. This is not the first occasion that Judge Easterbrook has suggested
that plaintiffs challenging particular trade restraints agreed to by members of a joint venture
must provide proof of economic power in a relevant market, no matter how unreasonable and
unnecessary the challenged restraints are to legitimate goals. See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest
City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985).
There is some irony, of course, in this narrow reading of NCAA by a leading antitrust
scholar who, prior to his appointment to the bench, represented the NCAA in its unsuccessful
attempt to persuade the Supreme Court that it lacked market power and thus could not unreasonably restrain trade. See Brief for the Petitioner, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984) (No. 83-271). In any event, it is clear that all major North American sports leagues do
enjoy economic power in the market for their players' services. See supra note 31.
121. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
122. Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
123. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F.
Supp. 73, 81 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978). In Smith, the district court
judge had similarly held that it "need not fully evaluate the league's claims of necessity for a
college draft because, even conceding the need for some such system, the current structure is
significantly more restrictive than necessary." Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 746
(D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For the NFL draft to be found lawful under
the rule of reason, the judge said he would have to find that the draft "is a reasonable way of
pursuing legitimate business interests, and that it does not have the purpose or effect of unreasonably restraining competition." Id. at 745.
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Pro Football, Inc.,124 the D.C. Circuit first questioned the degree to
which the draft accomplished the goal of competitive balance at all.
The court expressed the view that the key to competitive balance in
the NFL was not the amateur draft but the equal sharing of network
television revenues. 125 The court also suggested that the effect of the
amateur draft paled in comparison to the impact of the head coach on
the success or failure of the team, noting that over a three-year period
the same nine teams occupied twenty-two of the available twenty-four
playoff spots, and at least six of them included veteran successful
coaches. Thus, "the player draft does not have an equalizing effect to
the extent of knocking out the top teams, if the top teams have good
coaches.'1 26 The court concluded that "the effects of fine coaching
1' 27
swamp whatever effect the draft may have on team performance.'
Turning to overbreadth, the court noted that the league justified the
draft "primarily by the need to disperse the best players," but the restraint "applied to all graduating seniors, including average players
who were, in a sense, fungible commodities.' 12 The court suggested
several less restrictive alternatives to allocate amateur talent among
NFL clubs.' 29 Most significantly, the court noted that the "least restrictive alternative" would be the elimination of the draft and the use

of revenue sharing to equalize teams' financial resources. 3 °
Likewise, veteran players were able to successfully challenge the
NFL's restraints on free agency on overbreadth grounds in Mackey v.
NFL.' 3 ' The court emphasized the application of the virtual ban on
In Kapp, the court did not cite Addyston Pipe, but nonetheless adopted the same analytical
framework, relying on a "well-settled rule of contract law" that restrictions on an employee's
right to freely pursue his trade are permitted under a reasonableness standard only if they "afford fair protection to the interests of the employer without imposing such an undue hardship on
the employee as to interfere with the public interest." 390 F. Supp. at 81. The court concluded
that the NFL draft "goes far beyond any possible need for fair protection of the interests of the
club-employers or the purposes of the NFL." Id. at 82.
124. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
125. See id. at 1184 n.46.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1187 (emphasis added).
129. See id. at 1187-88. These included a scheme that would permit several teams to draft a
player and limit the number of players any one team might sign; league rules that set minimum
acceptable terms that a team must offer to a drafted player lest they lose their exclusive rights; a
second draft if a player did not come to terms with the team initially drafting him; or a sharply
limited draft that would cover only the top players. See id.
130. Id. at 1188.
The court in Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 88 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir.
1978), concluded without elaboration that the perpetual allocation to one team of exclusive negotiating rights to a drafted player was overbroad.
131. 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976). The court noted:

We need not decide whether a system of inter-team compensation for free agents moving to other teams is essential to the maintenance of competitive balance in the NFL. Even
if it is, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the Rozelle Rule is significantly

more restrictive than necessary to serve any legitimate purposes it might have in this regard.
Id. at 622.
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competition for player services to mediocre players as well as superstars. The court also noted that the restriction on a player's ability to
receive competing bids for his services was perpetual and that 132
there
were no standards for determining the compensation required.
While these blanket restraints faltered because of overbreadth,
others have been found illegal because the league was unable to show
any correlation between the restraint and its asserted purpose. Most
notably, the NCAA's television restrictions were invalidated by the
Supreme Court because they were not even "arguably tailored" to
promote competitive balance. 133 The Court expressed its doubt that
"there would have been a greater disparity between the football prowess of Ohio State University and that of Northwestern University in
recent years [the opinion was written in 1984, over a decade before
Northwestern's "miracle season" and Rose Bowl appearance] without
the NCAA's television plan."' 34 The Court also observed that the
NCAA produced no evidence that "the restriction produces any
greater measure of equality throughout the NCAA than would a restriction on alumni
donations, tuition rates, or any other revenue-pro'1 35
ducing activity.'
C. The "Single Entity" Argument
A final objection to applying the venerable Addyston Pipe methodology to sports league trade restraints comes from sports owners
and some academics, who assert that sports leagues should be considered a "single entity" akin to corporations or partnerships. If so,
agreements among owners would not be considered "contracts, combinations, or conspiracies," and section 1 of the Sherman Act would
not apply to them. This issue has been extensively debated in the academic literature and will not be rehearsed here in detail. 36 As the
132. See id. The most notable example of overbreadth was the application of the NFL's
compensation rule to the signing, by the lowly New Orleans Saints, a team that had recently
joined the league, of star receiver Dave Parks from the San Francisco 49ers, a contender. Commissioner Rozelle awarded the 49ers two first-round draft picks. This award, in particular, was

found to act as "an effective deterrent to clubs signing free agents." Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.
Supp. 1000, 1004, 1006 (D. Minn. 1975), affd, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
133. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 87 (1984).
134. Id. at 118 n.62.
135. Id. at 119.

136. For arguments in favor of a single entity defense for sports league owners, see, e.g.,

Myron G. Grauer, Recognition of the National FootballLeague as a Single Entity Under Section 1
of the Sherman Act. Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1983);
Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to
Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219 (1984); John C. Weistart,
League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition and Cooperationin the
Sports Industry, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1013. Critics of the single entity defense include Lee Goldman,
Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV. 751 (1989); Michael S. Jacobs,
Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status
Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues: Reexamining the Threshold Questions, 20 ARuz. ST. L.J. 953 (1988); Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust
Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 465-68 (1990).
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district judge who tried the recent NFL player restraint case found,
this argument has been expressly rejected by several courts of appeals
and implicitly rejected in the many other cases where player restraints
have been invalidated under section 1.137 The judge noted that prior
courts had relied on a host of factors in rejecting the single entity defense, including: (1) the organization of sports leagues as unincorporated associations of separately owned teams that do not share profits
and losses; 138 (2) the independent management of each team concerning matters such as player acquisitions; 139 and (3) active competition
among clubs in the acquisition of players and management personnel.14° This conclusion is likewise consistent with the general "ease
with which the courts have pierced the corporate veil to find a 'contract, combination, or conspiracy' when participants in an enterprise
are also competitors.' 4 '
In

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,142 the

Supreme Court held that the single entity defense is properly applied
to agreements between a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries.' 43 In contrast, there is clearly no "unity of interest" or "corporate
consciousness" among fractious sports league owners. 144 Owners of
clubs with poor records in markets where fans demand winners may
prefer fewer trade restraints, so that they can act quickly to meet consumer demand; owners of champion teams may prefer many trade restraints, so that they can keep their talented roster intact. Owners
who leave business operations to skilled general managers able to
137. See McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 879 (D. Minn. 1992); see also Los Angeles Mem'l
Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388-90 (9th Cir. 1984) (expressly rejecting this defense) [hereinafter Raiders]; North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d Cir.
1982) (same); Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 874 F. Supp. 844, 849 (N.D. I11.
1995), vacated, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
138. See Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1389-90; North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1252. Compare
Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982) (holding that price fixing by
doctors not sharing profits or losses was illegal under § 1), with Hassan v. Independent Practice
Assocs., 698 F. Supp. 679, 689 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (permitting price fixing by medical association
that shared all profits and losses).
139. See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 519 F. Supp. 581, 582 (C.D. Cal.
1981), affid, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
140. See Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1390-91; North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659,
666 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
141. Edward B. Rock, CorporateLaw Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 497,
506 (1992); see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 215 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (concluding that neither an exclusionary joint venture among independent
moving companies nor the American League's refusal to admit a new baseball team are exempted from § 1, but instead are "boycotts" to be analyzed under the rule of reason).
142. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
143. See id. at 771.
144. See Lazaroff, supra note 136, at 966; James L. Brock, Jr., Comment, A Substantive Test
for Sherman Act Plurality: Applications for ProfessionalSports Leagues, 52 U. Cl-. L. REv. 999,
1006 & n.30, 1007, 1031 (1985).
Although league commissioners may work hard to set policies based on a single
"Leaguethink," individual owners establish the policies based on their perceptions of their own
individual interests. See Ross II, supra note 36, at 701-02.
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identify talented prospects and balance the books prefer few trade restraints; owners who insist on intermeddling and are unable to avoid
overpaying mediocre players will demand more trade restraints. As
one district court found, winning "translates into greater financial
prosperity for the victors. One team's gain on the court is thus generally another's loss at the bank, and while some cooperation is necessary, the profit seeking interests of one team are often contrary to
those of other teams."' 45 As a result, the mix of trade restraints that
emerges will not necessarily be one that is in the best interests of the
sport as a whole, but rather the one that is in the best interests of the
requisite majority of the individual owners. The decision to operate a
sports league with independently owned franchises is thus not simply
a matter of "organizational choice, [an] apparently optional decision[ ]
that [can] easily be manipulated to satisfy current antitrust rules."' 46
The divergence of interests reflects economic realities and makes
sports leagues much different from the single entity that would be created if, for example, the Emir of Kuwait were to purchase the entire
National Hockey League and have his employees run the individual
franchises.
The critical difference between self-interested NBA owners and
the hypothetical league owned by the Emir of Kuwait also has been
recognized by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, who notes that when
the profit-maximization goals of a venture's individual members differ
from those of the venture as a whole, "the venture may be more likely
to behave anticompetitively.' 147 As Hovenkamp observes, this distinction has been recognized by the Supreme Court in cases like Associated Press v. United States,148 which invalidated AP's practice of
allowing newspapers to exercise a veto on membership applications
from competitor newspapers. If AP had been a single firm, it would
have admitted additional firms whenever efficient for the entity as a
whole and would
not have subjected an application to a veto by local
1 49
self-interest.
The argument that sports leagues are single entities not subject to
the requirement that agreements in restraint of trade be reasonable is
also inconsistent with more recent judicial developments. In its 1979
ruling on an antitrust challenge to an agreement whereby numerous
rival songwriters combined to set the price for one blanket license for
their copyrighted works, the Supreme Court took note of the new,
145. Chicago Prof'i Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 874 F. Supp. 844, 849 (N.D. III. 1995)
(footnote and citation omitted), vacated, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
146. Jacobs, supra note 136, at 40 (quoting Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status of
Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. An Alternative View, 60 TUL. L. REV. 562,
586 (1986)).
147. Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 1, 9 (1995).
148. 326 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1945).
149. See Hovenkamp, supra note 147, at 43.
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unique product being offered by the agreement, a product that could
not be offered without the agreement of competing songwriters.' 5 °
Still, the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the agreement was reasonable, rather than dismissing
the case because of the single entity theory. 151 Moreover, this theory
would dictate that the NCAA's television restrictions struck down in
1984 would not have been held unlawful, because no single college
can create college football on its own and no team has any independent existence
or worth other than as part of the integrated NCAA
1 52
framework.

However, new life has been breathed into league single entity arguments by the recent appellate decision in Chicago Professional
Sports Ltd. v. NBA. 53 The district court had read Copperweld narrowly, requiring a complete unity of interest among the defendants to
permit invocation of the single entity defense. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook regarded this proposition of law as "silly."' 5 4 Recognizing that

characterizing the NBA "is a tough question," his majority opinion
directed the district court on remand to reconsider the issue "using the
correct legal approach."' 55 Judge Easterbrook's reasoning is severely
flawed, and it is not clear that other courts will necessarily follow it.
Even within the Seventh Circuit, however, the majority's analysis suggests that blanket player restraints are subject to a rule of reason analysis under the Sherman Act.
Easterbrook correctly stated the characterization question in the
abstract: "Conduct that 'deprives the marketplace of the independent
centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes,' without the efficiencies that come with integration inside of a firm, go on the 'concerted' side of the line."' 56 The essence of the antitrust challenge to
blanket restraints is that the efficient operation of a sports league does
not require the elimination of "independent centers of decisionmaking" (each club) as to how much money should be spent on player
talent. Perhaps Judge Easterbrook means that whenever formerly independent firms combine to achieve efficiencies, whatever they jointly
decide should be exempt from rule of reason scrutiny; if so, he rejects
150. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1979).
151. See id.
152. It is true that professional sports league teams exist as integrated economic units, unlike the entirely separate and economically independent colleges that comprise the NCAA. The
fact that colleges operating major football programs also compete with each other in other markets is totally irrelevant, however, to the question whether their football programs exist as independent economic actors or as part of an integrated unit (the NCAA). Legal analysis of the
NBA's superstation rules would hardly be changed if, for example, NBA teams were operated as
divisions of 27 rival beer companies.
153. 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
154. Id. at 598.
155. Id. at 599.
156. Id. at 598 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769
(1984)).
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the teaching of his mentor, Judge Richard Posner, who wrote that it
"does not follow that because two firms sometimes have a cooperative
relationship there are no competitive gains from forbidding them to
cooperate in1' 57ways that yield no economies but simply limit
competition.'
The majority's analogies reveal a flawed perspective. Judge Easterbrook noted that divisions within a single firm might have competing interests, with separately compensated executives seeking to
maximize their own division's profits, but that these conflicts do not
"imply that these large firms must justify all of their acts under the
Rule of Reason."' 58 The critical difference between General Motors
and the National Basketball Association, however, is that ultimately
the decision whether Saturn should refurbish a run-down Oldsmobile
plant (good for Oldsmobile) or build a new plant far away from the
traditional culture of Detroit (good for Saturn) will be made either by
senior executives or a board of directors concerned only about maximizing revenues for the entire corporation, whereas NBA decisions
are made by the self-interested owners themselves. Similarly, the
court suggested an analogy to McDonald's franchisees. 159 Again, the
critical difference is that fundamental decisions about the price, output, and quality of McDonald's food160is made by McDonald's Corporation, not the individual franchisees.
The majority opinion in Chicago ProfessionalSports was careful
to suggest that sports leagues might be found to be a single entity
when selling broadcast rights "in competition with a thousand other
producers of entertainment" but as a joint venture "when curtailing
16
competition for players who have few other market opportunities.' '
Although the majority did not spell out the "correct" legal approach,
Judge Cudahy's concurring opinion did. He suggested that courts focus on whether the league's ownership structure affords individual
157. General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir.
1984).
158. Chicago Professional Sports, 95 F.3d at 598.
159. See id. at 598, 600.
160. In his initial opinion in the case, Judge Easterbrook foreshadowed this misunderstanding. He wrote that the "persons denominated owners of teams may not own them in an economic sense. Many of their actions are subject to review by the league's board, so that the
,owners' may be no more than financier-managers of the league's branch offices." Chicago
Prof'l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 1992). What his analysis ignores, however,
is the fact that these "financier-managers" are the league's board of governors, and their narrow
self-interested voting can block any changes that would liberalize trade restraints.
161. Id. at 600. This language suggests, though, that the court is improperly conflating the
single entity issue with the substantive issue, under the rule of reason, of whether the defendants
have significantly restrained trade. If in fact NBA broadcast rights are "reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes" with other programming, United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956), there is no unreasonable restraint of trade. If
NBA broadcasts are unique, cf. International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 250
(1959) (holding that championship boxing matches are a distinct market), then consumers would
be harmed by the restrictions on telecasting Chicago Bulls games at issue in Chicago Professional Sports.
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teams "some chance of economic gain at the expense of the
league.' 1 62 This analysis points to a joint venture characterization for
sports leagues when they impose blanket player restraints. Owners of
both teams with superior young talent and clubs with loyal fans who
will support the team without significant improvement will favor blanket restraints, even if the league as a whole would be better off with
free competition that affords clubs whose fans will reward
significant
1 63
improvement the opportunity to make that investment.
Characterizing a business entity as a single firm or a joint venture
is relevant to corporate as well as antitrust law. One reported decision
suggested in dicta that when the owners of clubs in the World Hockey
Association, which was organized as a Delaware corporation, sat as
the governing board of the league, they were obligated to make decisions for the benefit of the league as a whole even if it was against the
self-interest of their own clubs.'" It is clear, however, that the course
of performance of owners of the major professional sports leagues is
inconsistent with any notion of fiduciary duty to each other or to the
best interests of the league as a whole. As the Ninth Circuit noted in
the Raiders case, although individual clubs often act for the common
good of the NFL, reflecting a commonality of interest that exists in
every cartel, "we must not lose sight of the purpose of the NFL as
stated in Article I of its constitution, which is to 'promote and foster
the primary business of League members."" 65 Whether by course of
performance or explicit agreement, a business entity will be treated
like a joint venture and not like a single firm when the principals'
behavior suggests mutual relief from corporate/partnership concepts
of fiduciary duty."6 Courts have held that entities formally established as corporations can be treated under corporate law as partner162.
163.

Chicago Prof1 Sports, 95 F.3d at 603 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
As a matter of antitrust jurisprudence, Judge Cudahy carefully framed his analysis

within the context of an assumption that "the sole goal of antitrust is efficiency or, put another
way, the maximization of total social wealth." Id. at 602. He thus focused on whether an ownership structure affected the ability of the defendant to make efficient management decisions. Id.
at 603. Whatever the accuracy of Judge Cudahy's initial assumption under his own circuit's
precedents, the Supreme Court has never adopted this unidimensional view of antitrust. If, for
example, antitrust law seeks to maximize the wealth of consumers (who comprise the majority of
voters who elect legislators who enacted the antitrust laws), see Ross, supra note 37, at 8-11,
then, under Cudahy's reasoning, rule of reason scrutiny should apply whenever an ownership
structure affected the ability of a defendant to exploit consumers. Consumers clearly benefit

when the antitrust laws permit economic units to be integrated in order to produce a new or
better product but constrain these units from agreeing with each other unnecessarily where the
effect is to restrain output or make output unresponsive to consumer demand.
164. Professional Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass'n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983).
165. Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984).

166. Thus, although partners generally owe a duty to disclose information concerning partnership affairs, such a duty was held inapplicable where partnership documents expressly provided that limited partners in an oil development scheme were not entitled to confidential

information about the leases. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (5th Cir. 1993).
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ships where this reflects the reality of the ownership structure; 167
similarly, where a sports league claims to be a partnership, but the
reality of the ownership structure suggests it is a joint venture, this is
how they should be treated. 168
The landmark case defining reasonable restraints of trade, Addyston Pipe, established the principle that competitors may agree to
restrain trade among themselves only where the restraint is ancillary
and reasonably necessary to achieve a lawful purpose. 169 In NCAA,
the Supreme Court applied the Addyston Pipe approach in the context of sports leagues, holding that leagues carry a heavy burden to
demonstrate that significant restraints are tailored to promote competitive balance among their teams. 17 This holding applies fully to
player restraints. The following part applies the standard set out in
Addyston Pipe and NCAA to such restraints.
III.

APPLYING THE LEGAL STANDARD

In evaluating the legality of blanket restraints imposed by sports
leagues, the issue is, of course, not whether any restraint on competition for player services is permissible, but whether the particular
schemes adopted by the leagues pass antitrust muster. Blanket restraints have the purpose, and often the effect, of significantly limiting
the salaries of professional athletes, and they are the result of an
agreement made by league owners who would otherwise compete
with each other for players' services. In order to establish a prima
facie case, an antitrust plaintiff challenging these rules must, of course,
show that they have an anticompetitive effect. For example, the recent agreement in Major League Baseball 171 seems, at the outset, to
be a blanket restraint in form only-in actual effect, applying a tax
(rather than a cap) on only a handful of teams appears unlikely to
significantly reduce competition for players' services. Likewise, if the
league rules implementing a restraint are so riddled with loopholes
that the market for players' services is not effectively restrained, there
would be no Sherman Act claim. The standard set forth in NCAA v.
167. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512-13 (Mass. 1975).
168. Thanks to Cynthia Williams for her insights on these points.
Query why the National Basketball Association has not gone public. The owners would
benefit immensely from being able to sell shares in the NBA, even under extremely favorable
conditions whereby they could (1) maintain control by insisting that the stock was nonvoting and
(2) structure in advance the franchise relationship between the league and individual clubs by
preserving revenues from ticket sales, luxury boxes, and local broadcasting for individual teams.
One plausible reason why owners have declined this lucrative opportunity is that the Board of
Directors of the NBA would then owe a fiduciary duty to public shareholders to conduct their
affairs in the best interests of the entire league rather than the best interests of the majority of
the owners.

169. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), affd,

175 U.S. 211 (1899).

170. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984).
171.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Board of Regents suggests that a plaintiff challenging a restraint on
competition for player services would have to show that club managers are in fact significantly constrained in the freedom to bid for players whose services they desire and that there is an actual effect on
salaries paid or other significant market distortion. 172 Once anticompetitive effect is shown, however, the NCAA standard requires a professional sports league seeking to avoid antitrust liability to
demonstrate that its rules are reasonably necessary to increase the
quality and popularity of its173product by enhancing competitive balance throughout the league.
A blanket restraint that applies to all teams, regardless of their
rank in the standings, cannot meet this standard-it is not tailored to
promote competitive balance. The salary caps currently in effect in
the NBA and the NFL, the restrictions on free agency in the NHL,
and the punitive payroll successfully resisted by the baseball players'
union 174 each have this fatal flaw-they equally restrain teams with
high payrolls and successful records, for whom the acquisition of additional talented players might reasonably be thought to facilitate dynasties and harm competitive balance, as well as teams with high
payrolls and inferior records, whose owners should be required to expend additional capital in order to improve their product. Whatever
the legality of more modest or tailored restraints, the blanket restraints in effect in the major sports other than baseball cannot withstand antitrust analysis. 75
172. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102-04.
173. See id. at 113.
174. See Chass, supra note 5, at B13 (owners, either through a salary cap or a limitless
luxury tax on payrolls, sought to place a "drag" on player salaries and create cost certainty for
themselves).
175. No cases have directly addressed the legality of a sports league salary cap under the
Sherman Act. The NFL's cap was not introduced until it was made part of its collective bargaining agreement with the players' union and is thus exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the labor
exemption. See White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1431 (D. Minn. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th
Cir. 1994). The NBA's cap has been challenged three times, once when it too was incorporated
into an existing labor agreement, Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987), and on two other
occasions after the agreement expired. In these latter cases, the courts held that the labor exemption still applied to the agreement. See NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 690-93 (2d Cir. 1995);
Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965-66 (D.N.J. 1987).
The trial court in Williams, having first ruled that the NBA owners' agreement was protected by the labor exemption, went on to opine that "it appears that the Players have failed to
show that the alleged restraints of trade [including a salary cap] are on balance unreasonably
anti-competitive." NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 45 F.3d 684
(2d Cir. 1995). The court did not explain these remarks in detail, and the court of appeals found
it unnecessary to reach these arguments. See Williams, 45 F.3d at 688.
Because the current NHL rules that permit unrestrained competition only for the most veteran players are embodied in a collective bargaining agreement, they too are exempt from antitrust scrutiny. See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979).
Earlier cases condemned league rules that barred virtually any competition for services of any
player. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904, 912 (E.D. Mich. 1978), vacated on
other grounds, 600 F,2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 893-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). Although the current NHL rules have the fatal flaw, discussed in text, of apply-
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Two arguments have dominated the conventional debate about
blanket restraints. Leagues and their defenders argue that these restraints actually promote competitive balance. According to this argument, the restraints prevent rich teams located in big cities from
outbidding their smaller and poorer rivals for the best talent. It follows that an unrestrained labor market would result in competitive
imbalance and a less desirable product for fans generally. If the
league's argument were accepted, the antitrust significance is that the
restraint would be reasonable. On the other hand, league critics, principally from the discipline of economics, argue that the restraints have
no effect one way or the other on the allocation of players among
teams. 1 76 According to this argument, clubs will find ways (such as
cash sales or unequal trades) to ensure that players will end up on the
rich teams who value players more highly. Thus, although the restraints have a severe effect on players' salaries, the same degree of
competitive balance will result regardless of the rules that govern the
labor market. The antitrust significance of the critics' argument is that
the restraints are unreasonable, but the only ones who should care are
players; fans have no interest in which side of this greedy war prevails.
This article offers a third and different perspective: that blanket
restraints affirmatively harm competitive balance. The implications of
this argument are two-fold. First, the restraints are unreasonable
under the Sherman Act; second, sports fans have a vital stake in allying themselves with players' unions in the latter's efforts to resist blanket restraints. In short, the debate about blanket restraints is not
simply a tug-of-war between management and labor over their share
of the pie-it is a battle about the shape and size of the pie as well, a
battle in which players and fans have similar interests in free
competition.
To demonstrate the unreasonableness of blanket restraints, the
analysis in this part begins in subpart A with an example of a player
restraint that appears to be lawful because it is reasonably tailored to
promote competitive balance-the waiver rule. 1 77 Next, subpart B
marshals evidence to reject the owners' contention that blanket restraints promote competitive balance, 78 and subpart C then develops
the argument that, in fact, these restraints affirmatively harm competi-

ing to teams regardless of whether their acquisition of additional player talent would harm competitive balance, the current rules are significantly less restrictive than those condemned in

earlier cases by permitting unrestricted free agency for some veteran players.
The proposed "luxury tax" in baseball is a novel concept that has not been implemented
previously by any professional sports league and thus has not been challenged in court.
176. See infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 186-219 and accompanying text.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1997

tive balance. 179 Finally, subpart D concludes with a consideration of
less restrictive alternatives to improve competitive balance. 8 °
A.

A Reasonably Tailored Restraint-The Waiver Rule

The fundamental problem with blanket restraints can best be illustrated by contrasting them with the waiver rule imposed by virtually all leagues, a rule that has received little attention but that
exemplifies a restraint reasonably tailored to promote competitive
balance. The typical standard player contract includes a clause permitting the club to assign the player's services to another team in the
league; 8 ' under the waiver rule, a player's contract must be offered to
all other teams in the league before it is terminated. If two or more
teams would like to receive the player's services at the contract price,
the team that is lowest in the standings may exercise the privilege.
This is true, of course, even if another team would be willing to pay
the player more than the contract price for his services. Indeed, the
rule has a real effect only where a team with a superior record would
be willing to outbid others for the player's services; otherwise, the
team successfully claiming the player on waivers could just sign him
for the minimum salary.
In Major League Baseball, the waiver rule also comes into play
when a team seeks to assign a player's contract to a minor league club.
In general, 82 major league teams may have up to sixteen "optional
agreements" in effect at any one time. These optional agreements allow a team to send the player down to the minors over the course of
up to three seasons and then recall him back to the majors, as the
team sees fit. Otherwise,
no player may be sent to the minors without
83
clearing waivers.
179.
180.
181.

See infra notes 220-61 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 262-74 and accompanying text.
Players may individually negotiate no-trade clauses, see PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R.

ROBERTS, SPORTS AND TmE LAW 93 (1993 Statutory and Documentary Supp.) (reprinting base-

ball's standard player contract), and collective bargaining agreements often contain provisions
limiting a team's ability to trade veteran players without their consent. See id. at 61 (explaining
that baseball's collective bargaining agreement bars trades without players' consent for 10-year

veterans who have been with a club for at least five years).
182. The Major League Rules in this regard are quite complex. Many clubs have hired administrative staff, often with legal training, to advise them on how to comply with the rules.
Indeed, one noticeable snafu resulting in the loss of prized prospects cost a General Manager his
job. See Stan Savran, A Second Chance: This Time, PirateBrass Should Be More Tolerant with
GM, PrT-r. POsT-DIsPATcH, Mar. 6, 1993, at D4.
183. The rules are not models for future drafters. Ignoring some redundant and confusing
clauses, it may be best to focus on Major League Rule 11. Rule 11(a) requires that all assignments of player contracts be absolute, subject to Major League Rule 11(c). THE BASEBALL

BLUEBOOK 551 (1987). The latter provision permits a club, for up to three seasons, to assign a
player to a minor league club with a right of recall. See Major League Rule 11(c), id. at 552.
With that exception, Major League Rule 10(c)'s requirement that waivers are required for assignment comes into play. See id at 548.
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The waiver rule is tailored to promote competitive balance in two
respects. 1 ' In sports with minor leagues, like Major League Baseball,
it prevents dominant teams from stockpiling players who could contribute immediately to a lesser team. Suppose, for example, that the
pitching-rich Atlanta Braves have a talented starting pitcher who cannot break into their rotation. Unless the player is sent to the minor
leagues under an optional agreement, the Braves must either waste a
spot on their twenty-five man roster on a player who will not be effectively utilized or place the player on waivers so that he may be
claimed by a team with a lesser pitching staff. 185 Thus, the rule allocates released players whose services are in demand elsewhere so as to
promote competitive balance, to help the inferior team in the stand-

ings. Unlike blanket restraints, the waiver rule benefits, rather than
hinders, those teams with poor records who have an economic incentive (because of consumer demand) to improve their roster even if
they happen to be in large markets and already have large payrolls.
As developed below, blanket restraints are designed to prevent
teams from larger markets or with larger payrolls from competing effectively for player talent. The waiver rule would be analogous in anticompetitive effect if, instead of favoring the team that was lowest in
the standings, it gave priority to the team with the smallest payroll, or
from the smallest market. Conversely, blanket restraints would be
184. Waivers are also required in a third situation: when a baseball team seeks to assigni.e., trade-a player to another team after August 1 and before the end of the season. See Major
League Rule 10(e)(1), id. at 550. This requirement serves another purpose-to preserve the
integrity of the championship season by limiting the ability of teams to influence the pennant
race by making a favorable trade to one of the contenders. Teams out of contention by July 31
do, of course, make trades to acquire young talent that will help them in the future in return for
veteran talent that can help a contender now. Setting an early deadline makes this process more
available to all.
185. This antistockpiling rule is facilitated by Major League Rule 5, which permits teams in
higher classifications of organized baseball to draft players (after a three-year grace period) from
the rosters of clubs in lower classifications. See id. at 535-38. Each year, Major League clubs
must establish a 40-man roster (actually, if they suspect they might wish to participate in the
Rule 5 draft, they must leave a spot vacant). Any player not placed on that roster is subject to
being drafted by other teams, in reverse order of finish from the prior year's standings. See id.
Together with the option rules, the Rule 5 draft limits the ability of a team to maintain its rights
to the services of a minor league player with the talent to play on a major league team.
Although the rule primarily applies to a player whose team, because of questions about his
ability or health, is not confident of his prospects for major league success, it can have dramatic
balance-promoting effects when a team has a surplus of talent. Perhaps the classic illustration
concerns Hall of Fame outfielder Roberto Clemente. Signed as an amateur by the Brooklyn
Dodgers in 1954, he played in only 87 minor league games for the Montreal Royals of the Class
AAA International League. He batted .247 for Montreal, then a Brooklyn Dodgers' farm club,
and contributed a mere two home runs and 12 runs batted in. The Dodgers' major league roster
for that year constituted the famed "Boys of Summer" who would win the 1955 World Series,
and they left Clemente off the list. He was drafted for $4,000 by the last-place Pittsburgh Pirates,
for whom he started the following year (when they remained in the cellar). See THE BASEBALL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 416, 420 (Joseph E. Reichler ed., 7th ed. 1988); Don Reed, Eye Openers Column, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATcH, Oct. 4, 1992, at 2F; Trivia Quiz, SPORTINO NEWS, July 22, 1991,
at S22.
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analogous to the procompetitive waiver rules if they applied only to
those clubs who were most successful on the field.
B.

Significant, Across-the-Board Player Restraints Do Not Promote
Competitive Balance

While the waiver rule facially promotes competitive balance by
aiding weaker teams, a more complex argument is necessary for
league defenders to plausibly claim that blanket restraints promote
competitive balance.186 The argument proceeds as follows: without
blanket restraints, teams in certain markets will systematically outbid
others for talented players; these favored teams will therefore systematically dominate league play; the resulting competitive imbalance
will
187
reduce the quality and attractiveness of the league's product.
For over a century, owners have claimed that restraints on competition for player services are necessary to promote competitive balance. The analysis in this subpart demonstrates the fallacy of this
argument. First, empirical evidence rejects both the claim that a handful of rich teams systematically outbid their rivals for star players and
186. One principal justification for a salary cap is that it promotes investor confidence and
boosts the value of franchises by assuring owners that their salary expenses will be limited. Trial
Declaration of Russell T. Granik, Deputy Commissioner, National Basketball Association, 42,
NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (No. 94 Civ. 4488 (KTD)); see also George
G. Daly, The Baseball Player's Labor Market Revisited, in DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER: THE
BUSINESS oF BASEBALL 12 (Paul M. Sommers ed., 1992) (stating that sports league practices
"have an efficiency rationale" because they "secure and thereby encourage" investment). This
justification, of course, is no different from one employed by any buyers' cartel and cannot protect sports owners from liability under either the antitrust statutes or the common law. See supra
notes 94-98 and accompanying text. A salary cap may well be a system "'where it seems that
everything got better and both management and labor prospered but not at each other's expense,"' as NBA Commissioner David Stem claims. Anthony Cotton, David Stern with NBA
Ratings, Revenues up, CommissionerSees Resurgence, WASH. PosT, June 23, 1985, at D1. To the
extent that management can persuade the players' union, rather than a court, of this position,
both sides may agree to a salary cap that would be immune from antitrust challenge under the
labor exemption. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1982).
187. See Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 816 (D. Minn. 1988) ("While some freedom of
movement after playing out a contract is in order, complete freedom of movement would result
in the best franchises acquiring most of the top players."). A fine articulation of the leagues'
argument, albeit by two commentators who demonstrate its flaws, is provided in Christopher D.
Cameron & J. Michael Echevarria, The Ploys of Summer: Antitrust, Industrial Distrust,and the
Case Against a Salary Cap for Major League Baseball, 22 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 827, 852-53 (1995):
The competitive balance theory hypothesizes that unless all the teams in each league
agree to salary parity, great salary disparities among teams will emerge. Wealthier clubs in
the larger markets, such as Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York, will outspend poorer
clubs in the smaller markets, such as Montreal, San Diego, and Seattle, and sign the most
talented players. By cornering the talent market, the larger clubs will essentially buy division titles, league pennants, and World Series rings, thereby monopolizing success in the
sport. By contrast, smaller clubs will struggle merely to finish respectably.
The theory also projects that, as an oligarchy of wealthy teams emerges, we would see
the same clubs playing for the championship year in and year out. As the smaller clubs
become athletically inferior, fan support will dwindle, leaving small market clubs economically marginalized, if not bankrupt. Thus the sport's competitive balance will be destroyed.
As the authors note, the "main problem with the competitive balance theory is the lack of empirical evidence supporting it." Id.
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the claim that dynasties result from an unrestrained labor market. Indeed, the data suggest that teams in need of improvement tend to sign
more free agents. Next, a discussion of the realities of baseball's labor
market shows flaws in the theoretical underpinnings of the owners'
logic that big cities equals big money equals more talent equals dynasties and competitive imbalance.
Because sports feature a plethora of statistics, the owners' argument has been subject to a host of studies by social scientists. Those
who have studied Major League Baseball and the National Football
League have demonstrated that free agency in those leagues has not
enabled the teams located in large metropolitan areas to systematically outbid others, and these studies have been unable to find any
other coherent category of franchise that has dominated the bidding. 8 To be sure, all things being equal, teams located in larger
markets may be somewhat more successful in obtaining free agents,
and some franchises located in the smallest markets may face a disadvantage, but all things are rarely equal. Growth of markets plays an
important role, as does the willingness of the local fans to support a
winner and punish a loser by fluctuations in attendance.
The competitive balance argument discussed in the text above is
premised on the notion that a more balanced league will be more popular for more fans and is thus an economically efficient result. This
argument must be distinguished from the noneconomic argument that
it is somehow "unfair" that teams located in the very smallest markets
will often lose superstars to teams located in larger markets. Consider
the case of the Montreal Expos baseball team. Over the past decade,
the Expos have consistently been unable to hold on to their top free
agents. Nevertheless, skillful management has allowed the team to go
through cycles of rebuilding and excellence. These cycles epitomize,
rather than conflict with, competitive balance. The key to balance is
not that each team has an equal chance of winning half of its games
over the course of a decade, but that each team has a reasonable
189
chance of contending for the championship every few years.
188. See Alan Balfour & Philip K. Porter, The Reserve Clause in ProfessionalSports: Legality and Effect on Competitive Balance, 42 LAB. L.J. 8, 17 (1991); Donald J. Cymrot, Migration
Trends and Earningsof Free Agents in Major League Baseball, 1976-1979,21 ECON. INQuIRY 545

(1983). Although one early study found a "clear trend for free-agents to gravitate toward larger
cities," it was concededly based on gross numbers without looking at the quality of the teams
that acquired the players. George Daly & William J. Moore, Externalities, Property Rights and
the Allocation of Resources in Major League Baseball, 19 EcoN. INOUIRY 77, 93-94 (1981). A

later study showed general movement from smaller to larger markets, but this movement was
less significant than that from better to worse teams. See Besanko & Simon, supra note 116, at
82-83. One study actually found a greater movement from larger to smaller markets than vice
versa. See Eric M. Leifer, Endogenizing Context: Opportunity, Organization,and Dealmaking
in Major League Baseball, 23 Soc. Sci. REs. 263, 283 (1994).

189. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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Most importantly, the tendency for winning teams to lose free
agents (because each player is marginally less valuable to that team
than to a weaker team' 9° ) "should undermine further any trend toward domination by a few teams."' 191 Several studies of the movement
of free agents in baseball suggest that the value of a valuable veteran
player to an inferior team outweighs the increased purchasing power
possessed by a pennant winner from a large city."9 The NFL's presalary cap experience under the less restrictive "Plan B," which allowed non-star players to receive competitive offers, also showed that
"player migration was distinctly from winning teams to losing teams"
and that the four teams signing the most free agents were located in
relatively small markets with an average population just over two million, while the five teams with the
least movement had average popu19 3
lations well over eight million.
The data also reject the contention that freer labor markets result
in dynasties and reduced competitive balance. A number of studies
show a weak, insignificant correlation between on-field performance
and city size. 9 4 But almost all of the many studies that have compared Major League Baseball before and after the 1976 arbitration
decision that led to significant free agency for veteran players reject
the proposition that competitive balance has declined. 95 Indeed, as
190. For example, consider the great New York Yankee teams of the mid-1920s. The 1926
champions were a very good team, and they drew 1,027,000 fans. The 1927 team was one of the
best ever, winning 110 games while losing just 44 and finishing 19 games ahead of a very good
Philadelphia Athletics team. Nevertheless, this team drew only 137,000 more fans to Yankee
Stadium, while attendance in the rest of the league declined by 300,000. See JAMES QUIRK &
RODNEY D. FORT, PAY DIRT 242-43 (1992).

191. Cymrot, supra note 188, at 554-55; see also John Vrooman, A GeneralTheory of Professional Sports Leagues, 61 S.ECON. J.971, 975-77 (1995) (demonstrating that the marginal cost of
acquiring a star is higher for a dominant team than an inferior one and noting that those who
have ignored the increasing marginal cost of talent have thus overestimated the likely competitive dominance of teams in large markets).
192. For example, one study of the period from 1976-82 found that while 55% of free agents
moved to larger markets, 57% moved to teams with a worse winning percentage. See Besanko
& Simon, supra note 116, at 82-83. Among superior players, 59% moved to larger markets, but
64% moved to teams with inferior records. Additionally, some of the 36% of players who
moved to better teams helped competitive balance by allowing a second- or third-place team to
compete more evenly with the prior champion. Another analysis of 211 free agent acquisitions
from 1975 to 1987 found that smaller city teams were more likely to acquire players from larger
city teams than vice versa and that teams were least likely to acquire free agents from teams with
inferior records. See Leifer, supra note 188, at 283.
193. Balfour & Porter, supra note 188, at 17.
194.

See ERIc M. LEIFER, MAKING THE MAJORS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF TEAM SPORTS

INAMERICA 168-69 (1995) (finding a correlation between population and performance shows no
dominance by large-city teams); Philip Porter, Market Advantage as Rent: Do Professional
Teams in Larger Markets Have a Competitive Advantage?, in 1 ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS
OF SPORTS 237, 238 (Gerald W. Scully ed., 1992) (reviewing literature).
195. See, e.g., QUIRK & FORT, supra note 190, at 284-85; GERALD W. SCULLY, THE BusiNESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 95-97 (1989) (comparing pre- and post-free agency and
finding no increase in competitive imbalance in American League despite expansion, and increased competition within the National League); Robert C. Dolan & Robert M. Schmidt, Assessing the Competitive Effects of Major League Baseball's Reentry Draft, AM. ECONOMIST,
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discussed below, studies that focus on measures of competitive balance that seem better correlated with those factors most appealing to
sports fans suggest that competitive balance has improved as a result
of free agency.' 96 Similarly, a comparison of the standings in the National Basketball Association in eras where teams were forced to bid
competitively against franchises in rival leagues and eras of "secure
monopsony" revealed more balance when there is more competition
for players.' 97
A careful analysis of the economics of the professional sports labor market identifies the flaw in the logic of those who claim that
blanket restraints promote competitive balance. An owner seeking to
maximize profits' 98 will not pay a player a salary that exceeds the
player's expected marginal revenue product (MRP). 199 Only if the
MRP for most players is systematically higher in certain markets (such
as larger cities) will bidding for services be skewed in an imbalanced
fashion. For this to happen, the variety of factors that affect attendance and broadcast revenue must systematically favor certain
franchises over others. Evidence suggests this is not the case.
The conventional wisdom among economic students of professional sports is that a player's MRP will be systematically higher in
larger markets.2°° This consensus appears to be based on data showing that market size is a factor in explaining the likely movement of
free agents 201 and studies that show that teams in larger cities will, all
else equal, draw more fans than teams in smaller locales.20 2 The conventional wisdom, however, is suspect. An analysis of baseball
showed no statistically significant correlation between the size of the
city in which a team was located and its winning percentage. 20 3 The
data also suggest that all else is not equal: that in some markets fans
Spring 1985, at 21, 28-29 (finding that free agency caused no decline in competitive balance,

using Spearman rank technique).
196. See infra note 234.
197. Roger Noll, ProfessionalBasketball: Economic and Business Perspectives, in TiH BusiNESS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTs 18, 39-40 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds., 1991).
198. An unexplored area demanding further research is the extent to which an owner seek-

ing to maximize long-term profits might be willing to acquire a player for a wage in excess of the
short-term MRP, as part of management's effort to obtain or maintain fan loyalty. See infra note
209.
199. Trial Declaration of Roger G. Noll 7, NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (No. 94 Civ. 4488 (KTD)) [hereinafter Noll Trial Declaration]. A player's marginal revenue product can be roughly defined as the difference between the revenue the team will receive
based on its likely record with that player and the revenue the team would have received based

on the team's record with a mediocre player who was paid the minimum salary.
200. See, e.g., SCULLY, supra note 195, at 83 ("[P]layers are worth more on big-city teams
than on small-city teams.").
201.

See Donald J. Cymrot & James A. Dunleavy, Are Free Agents Perspicacious Per-

egrinators?, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 50, 58 (1987) (citing data to "support the position that
market structure does influence the outcome of the market").
202. The germinal work is Roger G. Noll, Attendance and Price Setting, in GOVERNMENT
AND Tm SPORTS BUSINESS 115, 154 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974).
203. See SCULLY, supra note 195, at 94-95.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1997

are more sensitive to their team's on-field success than others, independent of the size of the market. 2"
A player who can be expected to improve a team's win-loss percentage will be more valuable to a franchise located in a market with
fickle, fair-weather fans than in a market with a larger population of
loyal fans.2" 5 One study demonstrated, for example, that a one percent increase in the win-loss record would increase attendance at Minnesota Twins and St. Louis Cardinals games by more than 93,000,
whereas a similar improvement would yield an increase of only 74,000
for the New York Mets and 77,000 for the California Angels.2 °6 Another study incorporating revenues from concessions, parking, and
ticket prices found a similar variance that does not mirror the size of
the market; that study found that an additional win generated an additional $694,892 in revenue for the New York Mets, but only $253,839
for the New York Yankees, and $520,447 for the small-market Montreal 2 0Expos,
but only $138,543 for the larger-market Toronto Blue
7
Jays.

204. See Gerald W. Scully, Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 915, 920 (1974). Scully's statistical estimate of the marginal effect of win-loss records on
baseball attendance from 1957-71 showed "wide differences in the slopes" for different teams.
Id. Another empirical study found that prospective victories, prospective championship teams,
and past championships contributed significantly to the fans' interest in a baseball team, while
"generic" variables (such as market size) were less accurate predictors of attendance. See James
D. Whitney, Winning Games Versus Winning Championships: The Economics of Fan Interest
and Team Performance, 26 ECON. INouIRY 703, 705-13 (1988).
A number of scholars have used statistical analysis to determine the average marginal revenue realized by each extra game that a team wins. Scully concluded that, in 1968-69, "raising the
team win-loss record one point increases team revenue by $10,330." Scully, supra, at 920; see
also ANDREW ZIMBALiST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS 190 (1992) (finding that each .1% increase
in winning percentage augments team revenues by $63,026); Asher A. Blass, Does the Baseball
Labor Market Contradictthe Human CapitalModel of Investment?, 74 REV. ECON. & STAT. 261,
263 (1992) (stating that in 1987 marginal revenue from an additional win averaged approximately $315,000); James Richard Hill, The Threat of Free Agency and Exploitation in Professional Baseball: 1976-1979, 25 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus., Winter 1985, at 68, 70 (finding that a 1%
increase in wins equals $15,434 in revenue); J.C.H. Jones & W.D.Walsh, The World Hockey
Association and Player Exploitation in the National Hockey League, 27 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus.,
Summer 1987, at 87, 90 (stating that scoring a goal increases revenue by $5,117 for the NHL, and
preventing a goal increases revenue by $4,900). But, other than demonstrating that winning is
positively correlated with increased revenue, each of these figures appears to be a meaningless
average that predicts nothing about the marginal revenue increases for any particularteam.
205. See Vrooman, supra note 191, at 975 ("[A] small market team can still be competitive if
its fans have a sufficiently higher elasticity of the demand for winning than do the fans in the
large market.").
As Professor Porter notes, "The absolute value of the attendance and media revenue advantage in large markets does not affect the profit-minded owner's decision to hire talent." Porter,
supra note 194, at 238. Rather, the larger guaranteed season-ticket base, the value of local
broadcast contracts, and other benefits of major metropolitan areas result in an increased
franchise value-what economists would call rent.
206. See Philip K. Porter, The Role of the Fan in Professional Baseball, in DIAMONDS ARE
FOREVER: T-m BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 63, 73 (Paul M. Sommers ed., 1992).
207. See Dale R. Oorlog, MarginalRevenue and Labor Strife in Major League Baseball, 16
J. LAB. RES. 25, 30 (1995); see also GERALD W. SCULLY, Tim MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS
130 (1995) (stating that "revenue is 2.6 times more sensitive to club performance than to
franchise market size").
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Even if a player's marginal revenue were higher in larger markets
when considered in isolation, a player's value to any particular club is
a function of his teammates. Thus, although John Wetteland saved all
four World Series victories for the New York Yankees in the 1996 season, he was not given a serious offer as a free agent by the World
Champions, who planned on making another relief pitcher their star
"closer." Instead, Wetteland signed a highly lucrative four-year contract with the Texas Rangers (who lost to the Yankees in the 1995
league divisional playoff). Wetteland saved as many games in 1995 as
the entire Ranger bullpen; the Rangers blew eleven leads in the ninth
inning, and the Rangers' previous closer, who was not given a new
contract offer, blew six saves, lost seven games without a victory, and
gave up an average of almost six earned runs per game.20 8
These insights are significant. If marginal revenue is not an inexorable function of the size of the market, then the fans' response to a
winning team (in "economese," the demand curve) is likely to be (as it
is in many other industries) subject to dynamic movement based on
skillful marketing. Therefore, a franchise's ability to attract top players is, to a significant extent, a function of the quality of its front-office
management.2 °9 Consider two recent examples, the Colorado Rockies
and Seattle Mariners. Less than a decade ago, an analysis that focused primarily on market size concluded that the Denver market was
only marginally viable for an expansion franchise, although Denver
was fifth among metropolitan areas without a Major League Baseball
franchise and with a population greater than only three existing major
markets.210 In 1996, with a new stadium and effective marketing
throughout the entire mountain time zone, the Rockies led the major
208. See Jack Curry, Wetteland Closes, but It's with Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at Cl;
Kevin Lonnquist, Signed, Sealed, Delivered; Yankees MVP Relief Pitcher Teams Up with Rangers
for Four Years, $23 Million, ARLINGTON MORNING NEWS, Dec. 17, 1996, at 1A. Thanks to Jack
Sidorov for pointing out this excellent recent example.
209. Quirk and Fort's conclusion that a free labor market will "lead to a situation in which,
on average, strong-drawing areas have strong teams, and weak drawing areas have weak teams,"
QUIRK & FORT, supra note 190, at 276, seems to assume that the demand curve in each market is

static.
Because we know that Major League Baseball has enjoyed remarkable competitive balance
over the past two decades, see infra notes 234-38, some dynamic effect is likely to be present.
Otherwise, according to Professor Porter's study, supra note 194, the teams with the most elastic
demand curves would systematically outbid, and therefore dominate, those with inelastic curves.
One possible explanation for the lack of dominance in baseball may be that a player may be

acquired not because his salary is less than or equal to his expected marginal revenue product
over the term of his contract, but as part of management effort to manipulate the fans' demand
curve. One of the implications of Professor Porter's study is that management should undertake
marketing efforts to make fans less fickle (i.e., to make the elasticity of demand for wins less

elastic), so that it is not necessary to have a contending team and high payroll costs in order to
draw profit-maximizing crowds. However, if fans perceive that management is not actively trying to build a championship contender, they may become less loyal. Thus, skilled management
may well decide to acquire a player even if, using Porter's data, the additional wins attributable

to that player will not result in marginal revenue equal to the player's salary, so that the team
can maintain a more valuable asset-the loyalty of its fans.
210.

Ross II, supra note 36, at 758.
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leagues in attendance and had the tenth largest payroll in baseball,21 '
and are now considered to be among the "high-revenue, big-market"
franchises in baseball.21 z When the Mariners developed and maintained a talented team with the ninth-highest payroll in baseball, the
owners of this small-market team were rewarded with phenomenal
attendance, 21 3 thus demonstrating that large-market teams are not the
only ones who benefit from the ability to quickly improve.
Another flaw in the argument made by defenders of league restraints is that even where the data show a pattern of long-term dominance by some teams, all teams go through cycles of momentum
where they improve, peak, and decline. Thus, historically inferior
teams at their peak can compete successfully against historically superior teams in their decline. According to one statistical analysis, half
the variance in performance between different teams is really due to
this phenomenon.21 4
Professor Andrew Zimbalist's comprehensive study of the economics of baseball concluded that one reason that teams are not being
overwhelmed on the field is because baseball player's salaries do not
correlate closely with their current economic value, but rather with
As he notes: "[T]eam owners
their performance in the prior year. 215Ase
since 1976 have done a singularly unimpressive job of signing top-performing free agents or of paying a player according to his output.
Consequently, average team salary has been related only tenuously to
team performance ....Put differently, it has not been possible to buy
a winning team.

'2 16

In addition to management's inability to accu-

rately predict how much a player will contribute to the team's success,
other factors-including the decrease in "team chemistry" that can ac211. See Andrew Brandt, The Business of Sports (last visited Apr. 1, 1997) <http://
www.bizsports.com/mlb.html> (hard copy on file with University of Illinois Law Review).
212. Tony DeMarco, McMorris: Owners Need Convincing, DENVER POST, Nov. 5, 1996, at
D-7.
213. See Blaine Newham, Turnstiles Show Best Numbers for M's, SEAtTLE TIMES, July 4,
1996, at C1 ("Who would have ever imagined that Seattle would be averaging more fans for its
baseball team than Toronto or Boston or New York?").
214. See ScuLLY, supra note 207, at 84-85.
215. See ZIMBALsr, supra note 204, at 193.
216. Id. at 96; see also Cameron & Echevarria, supra note 187, at 871 (finding that during
1989-93, only six of the 20 playoff teams ranked among the top four in terms of payroll cost).
At first glance, the results of the 1996 season may suggest a contradictory trend that supports the owners' traditional claims: the teams with the four highest payrolls all made the playoffs. See supra note 7. The effects of revenue sharing and a limited luxury tax on the five highest
payrolls during the course of the new labor agreement will provide more definitive evidence of
whether Zimbalist's conclusions are outdated. A closer look at payrolls and profitability, moreover, suggests an image less stark than one obtained from looking only at the top finishers. The
fifth, sixth, and seventh biggest spenders (Chicago White Sox, Cincinnati Reds, and Boston Red
Sox) were not among the top eight finishers, and all suffered a reduction in attendance. San
Diego (18th payroll) won the NL East, and Montreal (lowest payroll) missed the playoffs by two
games. See sources cited supra note 7.
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company the signing of highly paid free agents,217 variation in frontoffice talent, and the reduction over time in the difference between
the best, average, and worst players in the league-help explain why
free agency has not reduced competitive balance in baseball. Any
team can compete effectively with a small payroll by making superior
cost-benefit decisions regarding personnel.218 In sum, the data do not
support the contention that the teams located in the largest markets
have systematically dominated their sports.2 19
C. Significant, Across-the-Board Player Restraints Actually Harm
Competitive Balance
Of greater concern to the public is the fact that blanket restraints
affirmatively reduce competition because they actually hurt competitive balance and thus diminish the quality of league play. 220 From the
217. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 204, at 96-97 ("[R]ich teams purchasing many high-priced
free agents may end up with destructive ego conflicts.").
218. See Oorlog, supra note 207, at 34. Oorlog's study found that the correlation between
payroll and winning percentage was statistically insignificant, and each team's total winning percentage had only a marginally significant correlation with its market size. See also Murray
Chass, Payroll May Not Buy Coveted Wild Card, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, Sec. 8, at 5 (Acting
Commissioner Bud Selig, owner of Milwaukee Brewers, attributes close race for American
League wild card between his franchise, with a $16 million payroll, and the Yankees, with a $55
million payroll, to efforts of general and field manager); Murray Chass, The Manager as Alchemist: Alou Turns Young Players into Gold for Expos, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1996, at C5.
219. Regardless of the empirical evidence, as a legal matter, blanket restraints are not appropriate, even if professional sports leagues might be justified in imposing some restraints to
correct for the competitive imbalance that results from a completely unrestrained market. This
is so for three reasons: (1) generalized restrictions on competition seem to be unduly restrictive
means of helping the small number of franchises that cannot compete in a free market; (2)
revenue sharing among teams is a far superior way of equalizing the value of players among
franchises; and (3) any other restraint designed to promote competitive balance should and can
be targeted to facilitating the reallocation of players from superior teams to inferior rosters, or
inhibiting the movement of players from poor to superior teams, rather than generally imposed
on all teams, regardless of their competitive position within the league. Because blanket restraints are not reasonably necessary to achieve competitive balance, they constitute unreasonable restraints of trade; in short, they represent the unjustified use of collective economic power
to transfer wealth from the players to the owners.
220. Professors Daly and Moore correctly observe that leagues have an incentive to prevent
player allocations that hurt competitive balance, and facilitate player allocations that will help
balance. See Daly & Moore, supra note 188, at 80-81. See also Daly, supra note 186, at 24.
However, this incentive is insufficient to avoid careful scrutiny under antitrust's rule of reason.
Owners are willing to tolerate reductions in quality because the revenue they lose is more than
recouped by the lower salaries they pay as a result of the restraints on competition for player
services. See Ross II, supra note 36, at 676 (noting that although the increased competitive
balance in baseball during the decade after 1976 coincided with a 57% increase in attendance,
salary costs escalated by 316%). Moreover, because of supermajority voting requirements, it is
not clear that enlightened leadership could persuade league owners to adopt balance-enhancing
rules even if they wanted to. These factors explain why leagues adopt blanket labor market
restraints that have the principal effect of monopsonizing the market, rather than tailored restraints that treat player moves differently depending on how they affect the efficient distribution
of player talent among the league's teams. It is one thing to prevent a dominant team, flush with
revenues from winning a World Series, from outbidding a small-market rival with a mediocre
record for one of the latter's free agents. It is another thing to impede a team like the Washington Redskins, with record sellouts, a high payroll, and a lousy record, from quickly rebuilding.
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perspective of the consumer-fan, the desirable aspect of unrestricted
competition is that it allows teams to spend money to improve themselves and reap the rewards through increased patronage. A recent
example of this phenomenon is the San Diego Padres. In 1995, when
the Los Angeles Dodgers clinched the division title with a win at San
Diego's Jack Murphy Stadium, a crowd dressed in Dodger Blue
roared its approval. In both 1994 and 1995, the Padres were last in
both win-loss record and attendance in the major leagues. In 1996,
the Padres sported the National League's second-best record, sixthbest attendance, 2 2 ' and, not coincidentally, a doubling of its payroll.2 22
If a team in need of selective or wholesale improvement cannot obtain
the players it needs because of a blanket restraint, it simply cannot
make a meaningful run for the league championship. In a free market, a team with a specific need can obtain a crucial player without
having to yield any other players as compensation, which, if the signing is a good one, will convert a contender into a champion, enhancing
the quality of the experience for loyal fans and attracting new fans.22 3
Very poor teams with no realistic hopes for immediate improvement
typically draw poorly at the gate because of consumer disenchantment. Not only will effective use of free agents improve their records,
and consequently their attendance figures, but the publicity generated
by the acquisitions will change the hopes and aspirations of the fans
and thus increase box office appeal.2 24 Blanket restraints limit every
club, inhibiting teams with both inferior and average records from improving. Blanket restraints interfere with this important free-market
mechanism and thus make output unresponsive to consumer demand-the hallmark of an antitrust violation.2 2 5
Neither trading nor the rookie draft is an effective alternative for
poor or average teams that wish to improve quickly. Notwithstanding
a few infamous one-sided trades, it is generally difficult for an inferior
team to improve significantly by trading, because the team must give
up one of its few talented players in order to acquire another one.
Indeed, exclusive reliance on trading harms competitive balance: a
superior team is likely to have players who do not contribute that
much to the team's success and whom the team can trade in return for
a player that can really improve its roster; an inferior team is much
221. See Brandt, supra note 7. The Padres' attendance increased by 84%; the runners-up in
this category, Texas and Pittsburgh, each enjoyed a 31% increase. Id.
222. See Tom Krasovic, Padres at the Break: Padres No Longer Outsiders at Home, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 9, 1996, at DI, available in LEXIS News Library, SDUT file.
223. See Balfour & Porter, supra note 188, at 11.
224. See id. at 11-12. The authors cite the example of the Chicago White Sox, who signed

free agents Greg Luzinski and Carlton Fisk in the early 1980s, thereby transforming the team
from an also-ran into a contender and dramatically increasing attendance at the gate. See id. at
11 n.11. The franchise's popularity was sufficiently great to persuade the taxpayers of Illinois to

contribute substantially-after the franchise threatened to move to Florida-to the building of a
new ball park.
225. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984).
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more likely to have to give up a player who does contribute to the
team's success in order to obtain a player who might contribute a bit
more. Although all sports leagues have drafts that give a preference
to lower-ranking teams in obtaining the exclusive negotiating fights
for amateur players, the NBA is the only league where an amateur
player can make a significant contribution without several years of
training.226 Thus, the draft is a highly unreliable means of improvement for weak teams.
Because the majority of sports fans root for teams who are not
among the top finishers each year, rules that inhibit quick and significant improvement by poor and average teams reduce the quality of
the product for most fans. This gives fans a stake in the players' efforts to fight restraints on competition. This conclusion, it must be
noted, is contrary to extensive commentary in the economics litera-

ture, where prominent scholars have defended the "invariance hypothesis," the view that player restraints have no effect, positive or
negative, on competitive balance.227 This hypothesis is based on an
application of the "Coase Theorem," which holds that the allocation
of legal fights will not, in a world of zero transactions costs, affect the
distribution of resources. 2" Relying on the Coase Theorem, supporters of the invariance hypothesis insist that the allocation of player talent does not vary depending on labor market rules, because a player
will end up on the same team-the one that values his services the
most-regardless of whether the league has an airtight reserve clause
or complete free agency. The only difference the labor market rules
make is that the player receives a large salary under free agency,
226. For example, only 17 of the 105 players picked in the first round of the NHL draft in
1985-89, and only one of the 105 players picked in the second round, played the following season
in the NHL. See William D. Walsh, The Entry Problem of Francophonesin the National Hockey
League: A Systemic Interpretation,18 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 443, 459 n.30 (1992). The NHL amateur
draft is such a "highly uncertain activity" because "junior players are far from having matured
when they are drafted." Not only do many top picks fail to contribute in the NHL, but other
players who were not even drafted become regulars or even superstars. Marc Lavoie et al.,
Discrimination and Performance Differentials in the National Hockey League, 13 CAN. PUB.
POL'Y 407, 414 & n.10 (1987) (citing examples of undrafted 50-goal scorers Tim Kerr and Dino
Cicarelli); Walsh, supra, at 453 (stating that objective indicators such as goals and assists, skating
skills, and defensive skills used in draft are "uncertain guides to a player's likely performance at
the NHL level of competition"). Less rigorous analysis of football and baseball suggests similar
results. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1184 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding that
player draft does not equalize talent if top teams have good coaches); Bob Nightengale & Ross
Newhan, End of an Era: Lasorda Retires; The 10 to Remember Him by, L.A. TIMES, July 30,
1996, at C4 (stating that Los Angeles Dodgers' catcher Mike Piazza, who is emerging as perhaps
the finest hitting catcher in baseball history, was drafted in the 62nd round by the Dodgers as a
favor to manager Tom Lasorda, who was a personal friend of his family).
227. A concise summary of this proposition is provided in Daly, supra note 186, at 13-14.
The proposition was first articulated in Simon Rottenberg, The Baseball Players' Labor Market,
64 J. POL. ECON. 242 (1956). As Daly notes, this hypothesis "proved compelling to many economists, some of whom viewed its logic to be so unassailable as to constitute proof of its empirical
validity. Its grip on economists' thinking persists to this day." Daly, supra note 186, at 14.
228. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 190, at 278.
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whereas the player's former employer receives a large payment in return for trading the player with a reserve clause.
Critics of the invariance hypothesis in turn have argued that the
2 29
world of professional sports involves significant transactions CoStS,
as well as other deviations from the idealized world of economic theory,23° that lead to a different distribution of player talent with a lessrestrained labor market.23 ' Although some of the earlier theoretical
criticism of the invariance hypothesis relied on the hypothesis' demonstrably false assumption that, where a player is more highly valued by
another team, his owner will simply assign his contract to the other
club in return for cash,232 later work has recognized that teams may
trade players of unequal value with side agreements concerning deferred compensation that is economically equivalent to a cash sale.
However, these trades are more complex, more costly, and thus less
likely to occur than reallocations in a free marketplace.233
229. For a detailed example of the difficulties in allocating players by barter when one
team's needs do not fortuitously complement another team's surplus players, see Ross II, supra
note 36, at 671-73.
230. One commentator has suggested that owners, like most people, do not value opportunity costs as highly as out-of-pocket costs and hence will refuse to trade or otherwise give up
players more highly valued by another team, even if the owners would be unwilling to bid a
sufficiently high salary in a free market for the same players. See Mark Kelman, Consumption
Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 684
(1979).
Another example that suggests that the real people who make economic decisions in the
baseball industry do not behave in a manner consistent with Coase's theories can be found in the
history of collective bargaining in Major League Baseball. Prior to 1976, a baseball owner had
perpetual and exclusive rights to a player's services. Although the players' union sought in labor
negotiations to bring about more competition for player services, the owners' economic strength
was sufficient to prevent the union from prevailing. In 1976, an arbitrator interpreted the existing language of the standard player contract so as to give a team owner the exclusive right to a
player's services for only one year beyond the contract period. The owners then agreed to a new
collective bargaining agreement, which allowed for complete free agency for veterans with six
years of service. See Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101 (Dec. 23, 1975). The Coase Theorem
would predict that, absent transaction costs, the same economic strength that permitted the owners to resist changes in the reserve clause would have permitted them to insist (through threat of
lockout, if necessary) on a bargain that overturned the arbitrator's decision and reinstated their
perpetual and exclusive rights.
231. The logical corollary to the Coase Theorem is that the allocation of property rights will
affect the distribution of resources if transaction costs are significant. See ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 78-83, 104-05 (2d ed. 1997).
232. Ross II, supra note 36, at 685.
233. I thank Roger Noll for this insight. Although some of Noll's work appears to support
the invariance hypothesis, see Roger 6. Noll, The Economics of Sports Leagues, in 2 LAW OF
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 17-1, 17-26 (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1988) (stating that
under free or restrained market, player will go to team valuing services most highly, the only
difference being "who receives the money: the player or his old team"), his most recent analysis
seems to be in agreement with this article's thesis. See Noll Trial Declaration, supra note 199, J
11 (stating that "greater restrictions against competition are more likely to create situations in
which teams are persistently good or persistently bad"). The different approaches taken by this
eminent sports economist may be explained by the time horizon being considered. For purposes
of pure economic analysis, the arguments for the invariance hypothesis have greater weight over
an extremely long period of time: even with blanket restraints, one might expect that lousy
teams in markets that will reward improvement will eventually get better. Neither antitrust law
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We need no longer rely on theoretical arguments about whether
free agency results in domination by teams in large markets or, conversely, whether a freer market allows inferior teams to rebuild
quickly. Empirical evidence concerning the movement of baseball
players, as well as the most important bottom line, the actual degree
of competitive balance within a league, supports the argument that
player restraints hurt, and free agency helps, competitive balance.
As Andrew Zimbalist notes, "By any measure, competitive balance has not only not become more unequal since [the onset of free
agency in] 1976, it has become noticeably more equal."2'34 One study
of the decade beginning with the 1983 season noted that baseball enjoyed a "remarkable" degree of competitive balance without blanket
restraints: different teams won twenty of forty division titles during
that period, fifteen of the twenty pennants, and nine of the ten World
Series, and all twelve National League teams took turns finishing in
last place.23 5
Although a complete economic model identifying those aspects
of "competitive balance" that make a sports league attractive to fans
is beyond the scope of this article, Judge Leon Higginbotham suggested that leagues are balanced when "each team has the opportunity
of becoming a contender over a reasonable cycle of years. "2 36 Given
that there are always more also-rans than champions, consumer welfare would appear to be maximized when there are more close pennant races and fewer dynasties. Several comparisons of pre- and postfree agency standings have demonstrated that under this standard,
consumers were indeed better off with free agency.23 7 Another study
that seems to best measure competitive balance as defined by Judge
Higginbotham showed that during free agency, the correlation between a team's performance in one year and its performance several
years later went down.2 38 In other words, free agency made it signifinor public policy support tolerating unjustified restraints because ultimately the market may be
self-correcting.
234. ZIMBALIST, supra note 204, at 95; see also Besanko & Simon, supra note 116, at 78-79
(1985) (presenting data showing that pitching, as measured by earned run average, was more
balanced after 1976 "suggest that if anything has happened, within-season competitive equality
has increased since free agency"; also finding no significant change in the correlation between
team success and market size before and after the onset of free agency).
235.
236.
462, 486
237.

See Cameron & Echevarria, supra note 187, at 853-59.
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
See Balfour & Porter, supra note 188, at 15 (comparing 1961-76 and 1977-88, and find-

ing decrease in percentage of races where no team finished within five games of pennant winner
from 50% to 25%); Ross II, supra note 36, at 673-76 (arguing that comparable seven-year periods showed increase in number of teams finishing within 10 games of the pennant winner from
34 to 48; increase in pennant winners from 11 to 17; decrease in teams winning four of seven
pennants from four to one; and decrease in races where no teams finished within 10 games of
pennant winner from eight to three).
238. See Balfour & Porter, supra note 188, at 16-17. Using this measure, a statistically significant correlation indicates that contenders and cellar dwellers tend to remain in their lofty and
lowly positions; whereas a low correlation indicates that contenders do fall back among the pack,
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cantly harder for top teams to maintain dominance and easier for
lousy teams to improve.
An important insight by one of the leading advocates of the invariance theory, Professor Gerald Scully, actually provides additional
support for the argument that restraints harm competitive balance.
Scully found that, over time, teams experience cycles of peaks and
valleys as their existing player talent develops, matures, and then declines-for example, when a team is composed of aging veterans of
past glory. 239 Nonetheless, Scully notes,
In rare instances, as in baseball underfree agency, a club can
buy wisely in the market for experienced veteran talent and immediately propel itself to a championship; recall, for example, the
remarkable transformation of Atlanta and Minnesota, which both
finished last in their divisions in the 1990 season; then finished
division winners and league champions in the 1991 season. The
acquisition of Barry Bonds by the San Francisco
Giants has led to
2
a remarkable turnaround for the club. 4
Scully's insights lend even greater credence to Professor Roger Noll's
observation that "greater restrictions against competition are more
likely to create situations in which teams are persistently good or persistently bad."' 241 In Noll's view, baseball teams have "frequently traversed the path from last place to pennant contender-and the
reverse-in a single season, with their fates determined by successes
and failures in bidding for free agents. The effect is more indeterminacy of outcomes. '24 2 Thus, what is rare is not the phenomenon observed by Scully of bad teams improving; what is rare is that baseball
is the only North American league sport with such few restrictions on
the acquisition of veteran players.
Supporters of the invariance hypothesis have presented some empirical evidence to support their claim. The most extensive analysis,
by Professors James Quirk and Rodney Fort, looked at the actual distribution of win-loss records, compared to the random distribution
that one would expect from a normal bell curve. They found no statistically significant difference in the degree of competitive balance
before and after free agency came to baseball.243 These scholars
and lousy teams have the opportunity to become contenders. A team's performance during one
year and its performance the following year were significantly correlated 86.7% of the time while
the reserve clause was in effect, and only 66.7% of the seasons during free agency. The elimination of significant player restraints coincided with a drop in significant correlations with a threeyear time lag, from 76.9% to 40%. See id. at 18.
239. See ScuLLY, supra note 207, at 88.
240. Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
241. Noll Trial Declaration, supra note 199, 11.
242. Id.
243. Rodney Fort & James Quirk, Cross-subsidization,Incentives, and Outcomes in Professional Team Sports Leagues, 33 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1265 (1995). Their methodology is similar
to that employed by eminent sports economists Roger Noll and Gerald Scully. Fort and Quirk's
previous study reached a similar conclusion. See Quinu & FORT, supra note 190, at 285.
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found a slight increase in the distribution of league championships
during free agency, although again the results were not statistically
significant. 24
This work might appear to undermine the claim that sport league
restraints actually harm consumers. On close reflection, however,
their study should be unpersuasive to those asked to evaluate player
restraints under the antitrust laws. At most, the study shows that the
data do not reject the invariance hypothesis to the high degree required for statistical significance. 45
If antitrust courts do not require such a demanding level of
proof,246 work by these economists and others actually supports the
argument that competitive balance has improved. In a prior work,
these same economists used the average dispersion of win-loss percentages over time as the measure of competitive balance and found a
persistent increase in competitive balance in baseball since the late
1950s, although the results were not statistically significant.2 4 7 (Under
this methodology, a league would be perfectly balanced if each team
played .500 ball.)2 48 Another empirical study using similar methodology likewise found that both baseball leagues have become increasingly more competitive.2 4 9
Quirk and Fort acknowledge that there has been "a discernible
trend toward more competitive balance in both leagues. '25 ° Yet they
proceed to attribute this change to (1) relocation of franchises to more
profitable markets; (2) the reverse-order-of-finish rookie draft introduced in 1964; and (3) the virtual disappearance of sales of star players for cash since the 1950s. Amazingly, although their data show that
baseball experienced much more balance during the 1980s than any
other decade this century, the authors simply note that during this period "there was collusion among owners in the veteran free agent market."' 251 Their failure to attribute improved competitive balance to the
more obvious and permanent change in baseball-free agency itselfis difficult to comprehend. First, although in theory competitive balance might be improved if teams with poor records in less profitable
244. See Fort & Quirk, supra note 243, at 1275-76.
245. See id. at 1275.
246. As a leading evidence scholar has noted, courts do not and should not be bound to
standards of statistical proof when making judgments about the probable effects of challenged
conduct:
My thesis, broadly stated, is that 'probability' as we use the term in law, particularly in
the civil standard of proof, is not a hard-edged mathematical concept. It is, rather, a concept that incorporates less rigid ideas of justice and reflects the judicial function of resolving
disputes in the real world, where values shift and knowledge is uncertain.
Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfindingat the Frontiersof Knowledge, 66
B.U. L. REV. 521, 521 (1986).
247. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 190, at 247 (tbl.7.1).
248. See id.
249. See Vrooman, supra note 191, at 984.
250. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 190, at 248.
251. Id.
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markets moved, the principal franchise relocations the authors cite all
involved teams that were highly successful on the field both before
and after their relocation.252 Second, if transaction costs are sufficiently low so that a player will always end up on the team that values
him the most, then the other two factors should be irrelevant to competitive balance. Assigning a star rookie's draft rights to a poor team
in a small market will, according to the invariance theory, simply net
that team a wealth transfer from a team in a large market that will end
up with the player anyway. If cash sales are not customary, the invariance theory suggests that teams would find some other equally efficient way of transferring the contracts of players to their most valued
employers. These two factors are relevant only if, as this article asserts, there are significant transaction costs involved in allocating
player talent so that restraints on a free market will affect the allocation of player talent. As to Quirk and Fort's last point, it is difficult to
understand how they can plausibly suggest that the continuing increase incompetitive balance through the 1970s and 1980s is attributable to a three-year period of collusion (1988-90) in the free agent
market. Thus, it is not surprising that, in their later work, these authors were compelled to concede that "if anything, competitive
bal253
ance has improved slightly under free agency in baseball.
Even if the Quirk and Fort studies showed no significant change
in competitive balance since free agency, their measurement of competitive balance, the degree to which clubs deviate from the mean
(.500 ball), is probably not the best measure of those aspects of balance that fans desire and that improve output. Several obvious scenarios demonstrate that a league which was completely balanced
according to their methodology would not be very attractive to fans,
while a league that was completely imbalanced would be more attractive. Consider the following hypothetical' based on the win-loss record's of the teams that comprised the National League during the
1960s:

252. The authors refer to the moves of the Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles, the New York
Giants to San Francisco, and the Milwaukee Braves to Atlanta. See id.
253. Fort & Quirk, supra note 243, at 1276.
254. This hypothetical is inspired by the analysis of competitive balance in college football in
Randall W. Bennett & John L. Fizel, BroadcastingDeregulation and Competitive Balance, 54
AM. J.ECON. & Soc. 183 (1995). In that study, the authors observe that the measure used by
Quirk and Fort, and others, "captures the dispersion in team winning percentage but does not
identify which teams have done best or which teams have done worst." Id.at 191.
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TABLE 1
HYPOTHETICAL NATIONAL LEAGUE STANDINGS

Year
Dodgers
Cubs
Reds
Pirates
Braves
Cardinals
Phillies
Astros
Mets
Giants
Year
Pirates
Dodgers
Cardinals
Braves
Astros
Mets
Cubs
Reds
Phillies
Giants

1
95-67
88-74
87-75
86-76
84-78
78-84
76-86
75-87
74-88
67-95
4
105-57
104-58
103-59
102-60
81-81
81-81
60-102
59-103
58-104
57-105

Year
Dodgers
Reds
Cubs
Phillies
Cardinals
Braves
Pirates
Astros
Mets
Giants
Year
Astros
Mets
Cubs
Reds
Dodgers
Phillies
Pirates
Cardinals
Braves
Giants

2
100-62
87-75
85-77
82-80
82-80
80-80
80-82
85-77
75-87
62-100
5
100-62
99-63
98-64
97-65
96-66
66-96
65-97
64-98
63-99
62-100

Year 3
Cubs
94-68
Dodgers
93-69
Reds
87-75
Cardinals
82-80
Phillies
81-81
Braves
81-81
Pirates
80-82
Astros
75-87
Mets
69-93
Giants
68-94
Year 6
Phillies
100-62
Braves
99-63
Cardinals
98-64
Dodgers
82-80
Astros
81-81
Mets
81-81
Cubs
80-82
Giants
64-98
Reds
63-99
Pirates
62-100

By focusing on the distribution of wins and losses, Quirk and Fort
would conclude that the first three years were relatively balancedthe teams' win-loss records followed the standard bell-shaped statistical curve. 255 Then, they would suspect that something untoward

might have happened because beginning in the fourth year, the standings became very skewed and "imbalanced." On the other hand, most
fans across the country would probably enjoy the latter three years of
baseball more than the first three. Outside of Chicago, Cincinnati,
and Los Angeles, fans never got to see their teams in contention during the first three years. In contrast, every team but the Giants was in
a very close pennant race at least once during the last three years.
Baseball fans generally also would prefer the latter years, which always featured close down-to-the-wire races between three outstanding
clubs. In particular, is there any doubt that Pirate fans would gladly
suffer through Year 6, when their team was a horrendous thirty-eight
games out of first place, as the price to pay for the joy of Year 4, when
their team won a fantastic 105 games and beat out two close rivals in a
255. A baseball league that was perfectly balanced and played 162 games would have a
standard deviation of .039, which means that two-thirds of the teams would win between 75 and
87 games, almost all the rest would win no fewer than 68 games and no more than 93 games, and
one in 20 would win more than 99 games. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 190, at 245.
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torrid pennant race? This example illustrates why Professor Porter's
study25 6 focusing on how often top teams maintain dominance and cellar-dwellars remain in the basement-a study concluding that competitive balance has improved since the onset of free agency-more
accurately measures the consumer welfare effects of competitive balance than the Fort and Quirk approach.25 7 In sum, antitrust judges
and other policymakers should glean from the economic literature a
clear message that the experience of Major League Baseball demonstrates that blanket restraints harm competitive balance.
The particular features of the salary caps currently in place in the
NFL and the NBA raise additional problems that exacerbate the harm
to fans. It is not unusual for veteran players to be paid in excess of
their expected marginal revenue product late in their careers, because
local fans may be willing to patronize the team in order to see these
aging stars quite apart from the stars' ability to win games.2 58 The
NFL's salary cap, for example, does not account for this phenomenon,
thus forcing a team to release or trade a popular star so as to limit
payroll and meet the cap. The NBA responded to this concern by
allowing teams to re-sign their own players without regard to salary
limitations. 259 However, this approach exacerbates the competitionlessening effect of a salary cap by making it even more difficult for
inferior teams to improve. Every team has a decided advantage in the
bidding war for its own players, which will tend to facilitate the status
quo and make it harder for inferior teams to lure players away from
or two
superior ones. This is especially true in basketball, where one
260
key players can significantly affect a team's overall quality.
See Porter, supra note 194.
One statistically important cause of competitive imbalance has been expansion. See
QUIRK & FORT, supra note 190, at 250 ("For the first few years of their history, expansion teams
are manned primarily by players acquired in the expansion draft, which pretty much ensures
very weak teams with low W/L records."). However, the Colorado Rockies have enjoyed remarkable success in their early years, in part due to their ability to sign free agents. The 1996
NFL season amply demonstrated the success achievable by expansion franchises who are not
subject to blanket restraints. See Helyar, supra note 8, at Al. (Note: because the Carolina and
Jacksonville franchises were new, they had no preexisting payroll to count against a salary cap,
so the cap did not effectively constrain them.)
258. See SCULLY, supra note 207, at 87-88.
259. Under the recently ratified collective bargaining agreement in basketball, the team may
re-sign one of its own players for any amount of money, with up to 150% of the player's prior
salary counting against the cap. For example, the Chicago Bulls were free to pay Michael Jordan
$30 million, although to do so would violate the cap. Because Jordan's previous wage was $3.7
million, for cap purposes Jordan's salary is only considered $5.55 million. See Mark Asher, Bulls
Give Jordan a Record Deal, WASH. POST, July 13, 1996, at Cl.
260. Salary caps also inhibit efficient trades among average teams. Suppose Team A has an
overpaid power forward yet covets Team B's lower paid reserve point guard. In a free market,
the clubs could arrange a trade and negotiate over what portion of the forward's salary each
would pay. In the NBA, the power forward's salary will count against Team B's salary cap, and
thus Team B could make the trade only if it parted with additional talent. See Barry M. Staw &
Ha Hoang, Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing Time and Survival in Professional Basketball, 40 ADMIN. SCL Q. 474, 487-88 (1995).
256.
257.
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Defenders of the NBA salary cap have argued that the cap enhances competition by requiring all teams to spend a minimum
amount on salaries and thereby field more competitive teams. However, in operation, the NBA rules provide no meaningful incentive for
a team to increase its payroll expenditures. Although NBA rules contain a financial penalty for franchises with low payrolls, the NBA central office has interpreted the rules so that the penalties do not apply if
the overall level of salaries throughout the league exceeds the minimum required by the collective-bargaining agreement. Because of the
loophole for re-signing current players, NBA payrolls easily exceed
the requisite minimum, so 261
that no team is required to make any particular level of investment.
The foregoing analysis indicates that the baseball players' firm
and successful rejection of the owners' initial demand for a salary cap
and the subsequent demand for a comprehensive, competition-lessening luxury tax benefitted sports fans in addition to serving their own
self-interest. Each season ends with the majority of baseball fans disappointed with their team's performance, and the only way for inferior teams to improve quickly or for marginal teams to add the one
"missing element" is through the addition of new talent that costs the
owner money but does not cost the team a valued player from its existing roster. Contrary to conventional economic wisdom, Major
League Baseball's experience under free agency shows that the existence vel non of significant trade restraints does affect the outcome of
championship seasons: using the most reliable statistical measures,
competitive balance has increased since baseball's rules changed to
permit significant free agency.
D. Blanket Restraints Are Unnecessary

The final, fatal flaw in efforts to justify blanket restraints under
the antitrust laws is that they are unnecessary. Rivals may not adopt
clearly anticompetitive agreements where a clearly less restrictive alternative appears, 262 and revenue sharing is an obvious less restrictive
261. See D. Albert Daspin, Note, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops: Fouling
Out the Salary Cap, 62 IND. L.J. 95, 107 (1986). Daspin suggests that the NBA's official interpretation of the agreement's minimum-spending requirement is contrary to the original goals of the
salary cap and demonstrates that competitive balance is not what actually motivated the NBA to
introduce a salary cap. See id. at 107, 119, 124.
262. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 352-54 (1982) (holding that

illegal price agreement among doctors unnecessary to provide health insurance coverage because insurance companies, rather than doctors, can set price); McNeil v. NFL, 1992-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) T169,982, at 68,771-72 (D. Minn. 1992) (instructing jury that if league rules substan-

tially harmed competition for player services, burden then shifted to league to show restraints
were "reasonably necessary" to achieve competitive balance); cf. Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The Football Answer to the Baseball Problem: Can Revenue Sharing Work?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L.

419, 421 (1995) ("One of the reasons the owners have been relatively unified in pressing for a
salary cap is that taking from the players is a far easier concept for them to agree upon than
sharing amongst themselves.").
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way of negating any imbalancing factors that may exist in an unrestrained market. For example, NBA franchises located in major media markets, such as the New York Knicks and the Chicago Bulls,
receive significantly more revenue from luxury boxes, game tickets,
and local broadcast rights than do smaller market franchises such as
the Sacramento Kings or the Milwaukee Bucks. Requiring New York
and Chicago to share these revenues with Sacramento and Milwaukee
would appear to be an effective way of achieving the NBA's purported goal of achieving competitive balance. Under a system that
included revenue sharing and did not impose salary caps, a small-market team not only would be permitted to sign highly paid superstars,
but its ability to do so would be significantly increased, given the funds
263
it would receive from richer and more successful franchises.
Where, as appears to be the case in baseball, gate receipts are more
sensitive than broadcast revenues to team performance, teams in
small markets can and do outdraw franchises in large metropolitan
areas if they perform better on the field. Thus, sharing broadcast revenues would significantly diminish any advantage that franchises in
large markets have in bidding for player services. 26 One study
showed, for example, that the NFL, which shares all broadcast and
ticket revenue, is significantly more balanced than the NBA.2 65
Major League Baseball owners have suggested that revenue sharing is not a less restrictive alternative to salary caps, but instead that
salary caps are necessary to effectuate revenue sharing. A salary floor
might well be linked to revenue sharing, so that richer teams could be
sure that those receiving shared revenue did not merely pocket the
money but used it to boost payroll.2 66 But it is unclear why a salary
cap is essential. According to the owner of the Boston Red Sox, "If
we're giving away some of our money, we need to know there won't
be a competitive imbalance in that the Yankees still could withstand
263. Conventional economic analysis, which is premised on the notion that a championship
team will attract less revenue in a small market, would suggest that Sacramento would not have

an incentive to bid against franchises in larger markets for these stars. As shown in Porter, supra
note 194, Sacramento's ability to recoup its investment in star players is more a function of how
responsive Kings' fans are to the team's record rather than of market size. In any event, a
revenue-sharing scheme can be designed to increase the Kings' incentive to build a superior
basketball team, and league rules can require a certain minimum level of expenditure on
salaries.
264. See Rosenthal, supra note 262, at 431 & n.41 (noting that Seattle Mariners, Kansas City
Royals, Minnesota Twins, Oakland Athletics, Cincinnati Reds, and St. Louis Cardinals were all
able to outdraw the New York Mets and Yankees in 1991). Even advocates of the conventional
view that labor market restraints do not affect competitive balance acknowledge that "introducing local TV revenue sharing would move the league toward more equal competitive balance,
which increases league-wide revenues and profits." Fort & Quirk, supra note 243, at 1288.

265. See Vrooman, supra note 191, at 984. Concededly, Vrooman's measure-comparison
of actual standard deviations to a bell curve-is not the most accurate way of measuring those
aspects of competitive balance that are attractive to fans. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.

266. But see Daspin, supra note 261, at 107 (1986) (criticizing NBA officials for interpreting
salary cap rules so as to excuse low payroll teams from increasing payrolls).
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their [revenue-sharing payment] and have a higher payroll than US." 267
This argument fails to appreciate that the purpose of revenue sharing
is to help equalize the bidding between the wealthiest and poorest
franchises, not to eliminate completely all wealth disparities or to prevent the wealthiest teams from spending more on player salaries than
others.
The leagues' inability to demonstrate that blanket restraints are
reasonably necessary to promote competitive balance bears a distinct
likeness to the NCAA's inability to persuade the Supreme Court that
its television restraints were justifiable. In rejecting those efforts, the
Supreme Court noted that the NCAA had done virtually nothing to
achieve competitive balance among college football teams other than
to limit the ability of successful programs to freely televise their
games; it had not, for example, limited overall spending by football
programs or restricted the amount of alumni funds colleges could
dedicate to athletic programs.268 Moreover, the Court observed that
college basketball had maintained competitive balance without imposing comparable television restrictions.269 Similarly, sports leagues do
not limit spending in any area other than player salaries, nor (excepting the NFL) have owners been willing to facilitate a more competi270
tive environment by sharing any significant amount of revenues.
Despite the obvious impact that high-quality coaches, scouts, and
player personnel directors have on a franchise's success, there are no
restrictions whatsoever on the ability of the richest teams to horde
talent in those positions. 271 Finally, just as college basketball's success
267. Mark Maske, The Evolution of a Major League Disaster, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1994, at
D1 (quoting Boston Red Sox General Partner John Harrington).
268. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984).
269. See id. at 120.
270. Following the trial in a suit challenging the NBA's broadcast restrictions, the trial judge
found that only 6% of regular season home gate revenues were shared, no revenue from the sale

of local broadcast rights was shared, and total revenue from shared sources amounted to a maximum of 20% of team revenue. The trial court concluded that the NBA's failure to share revenue
more generously had an adverse impact on competition on the court. See Chicago Prof'l Sports
Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1341-42 (N.D. IU. 1991), affd, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.

1992).
Until their most recent agreement, the baseball owners engaged in very little revenue sharing. National broadcasting revenues are split evenly among the 28 teams, but gate receipts are
shared minimally (the visiting team gets 5% of gate receipts in the National League and 25% in
the American League), and local television revenue is not shared at all. As a result, there is a
wide disparity in revenue among the teams: in 1994, for example, total projected revenue for the
New York Yankees was $94.8 million, but only $37.3 million for the Pittsburgh Pirates. See
Charles D. Marvine, Comment, Baseball's Unilaterally Imposed Salary Cap: This Baseball Cap
Doesn't Fit, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 625, 659 (1995) (citing Maske, supra note 267, at Dl, D6).

Under a new revenue-sharing plan that is being implemented along with the new labor agreement, a small tax on each player's salary, along with a portion of local broadcast rights, would be

shared by owners. The effect would be a transfer of approximately $39 million from high- to
low-revenue clubs. See Murray Chass, Team Owners Approve Revenue-Sharing Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at B10.
271. See Noll Trial Declaration, supra note 199, 1 29. As Professor Noll notes, the New

York Knicks had a long history of spending significant amounts of money on players, but they
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without television restrictions demonstrated to the Supreme Court
that the NCAA's restrictions were not necessary to achieve competitive balance in college football, Major League Baseball's ability to
achieve superior competitive balance without blanket restraints demonstrates that those restraints are unreasonable in all professional
sports.
One form of a salary cap that might pass antitrust muster (and be
acceptable to players) is what tax lawyers might call a "progressive
salary cap." Such a cap would operate differently for each team, depending on its record during the previous season, with a "tight fitting"
cap on the top handful of teams, a more relaxed limitation on contenders, and no salary limitation on below-average teams. One example of this type of scheme is the so-called Rooney Rule, which under
the NFL's current collective bargaining agreement comes into play if a
salary cap is not in effect.272 Under this rule, the top eight teams are
limited in their ability to sign a greater number of veteran free agents
than they lost from their own roster.27 3 Unlike the salary caps in effect in the NBA and NFL, this rule is tailored to promote competitive
balance. It restrains only those teams whose continued improvement

would actually jeopardize such balance, without limiting franchises
who, due to bad luck, poor personnel decisions, or other factors, have
high payrolls but poor records.2 74
IV.

CONCLUSION

One of the realities of the business world is that firms with an
inferior product must often spend more than rivals with a superior
were never in serious contention for a championship until they acquired Pat Riley as their coach.
See id. Likewise, in finding that the NFL draft was not reasonably tailored to achieve competitive balance, the District of Columbia Circuit noted that six football franchises consistently made
the playoffs despite low draft picks because of the continuity they enjoyed under successful
coaches and that four franchises continued to flounder until they were able to hire a top coach.
See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1184-85 n.86 (D.C. Cir. 1978). And finally, one
study suggested that Earl Weaver's contribution to the success of the Baltimore Orioles was as
great as Sandy Koufax's contribution to the Los Angeles Dodgers. See Phillip Porter & Gerald
Scully, Measuring ManagerialEfficiency: The Case of Baseball, 48 S. EcoN. J. 642, 649 (1982).
272. This occurred only during the first year of the agreement, in 1994.
273. See White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1413 (D. Minn. 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir.
1994).
274. As noted above, because the luxury tax adopted by baseball owners inhibits, but does
not preclude, additional free agent bidding by teams with the five highest payrolls, it may not
constitute a significant restraint at all. The White Sox signing of Albert Belle to a multiyear, $55
million contract, for example, would result in a tax this year of $3.5 million. See Claire Smith, In
Baseball, Reinsdorf Smiles Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1996, at B17. If the tax were really
competition-inhibiting, however, it would be problematic. After all, the White Sox suffered a
loss in attendance in 1995, did not make the playoffs, and finished 14 games behind the Cleveland Indians. Signing one of the Indians' star players would seem to promote, rather than hinder, competitive balance and thus should be encouraged, not discouraged (unless the only
consumers whose welfare one is seeking to maximize are Indian fans!).
Another alternative designed to actually achieve competitive balance would allow inferior
teams to "draft" players from the rosters of superior teams. See Marvine, supra note 270, at 658.
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product in order to compete effectively. Lee Iacocca, for example,
spent hundreds of millions of dollars reorganizing Chrysler, money
that would not have been spent had Chrysler not been losing market
share because of inferior products. Similarly, owners whose teams
perform poorly due to bad luck, mismanagement, or the natural aging
of players, must increase their investment to regain prominence.
In contrast to the realities of a free market, blanket restraints
condemn fans of perennial losers to yet another season with little
hope that their favorites will rapidly improve. These restraints ought
to be found unreasonable under the antitrust laws because they are
not tailored to improve competitive balance. Indeed, notwithstanding
some economic literature to the contrary, these restraints actually reduce competitive balance among the teams in a sports league.
Sports fans need not rely solely on the antitrust laws, however, to
secure the benefits of free competition in the player market. Rather,
consumers can form an alliance with the players, who also favor unrestrained competition. To be sure, fans would probably prefer to endure an anticompetitive system of restraints than see a World Series
cancelled; in this sense, the interests of fans and players are not always
identical. Still, if all fans are to be treated to exciting pennant races in
the coming years, and if fans of teams who used to be resigned to
waiting until next year are to be in the thick of the race, it is clear that
the credit should not go to Bud Selig and the owners, but rather to
Don Fehr and the players' union, and to the memory of Curt Flood.

